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This dissertation studies the influence of some political factors on economic
policy. Chapter 1 studies the choices of central bankers when: (i) central bankers
are government appointees; (ii) monetary policy is decided by a committee. In
this framework each central banker faces incentives to protect the Central Bank’s
reputation and incentives to show loyalty to the government in order to be reap-
pointed. I show that collective policy-making can be better than having a single
central banker at achieving low inflation and isolating policy from government
pressures, because the committee can reduce the relative value central bankers
assign to reappointment. For this to hold, the committee must be small so that
each member values the impact of his vote on policy, while the rate of turnover
of members must be small so that the risk of being replaced for deviating from
the government’s preferred policy is small.
Chapter 2 uses the view that politicians favor the interests of specific groups
of voters to explain political budget cycles in a model with rational voters. Vot-
ers use past fiscal policy to learn information about which types of spending the
incumbent is likely to favor if re-elected. The result is a pre-electoral shift of gov-
ernment resources from non-targeted types of expenditures toward goods specific
groups of voters care more about. Pre-electoral transfers are mostly directed to
undecided groups of voters. Even though voters are rational and predict this be-
havior, they respond to electoral manipulation, since they cannot observe whether
they are being targeted because they are crucial to the incumbent’s re-election
or because they are genuinely liked.
In chapter 3, I use data on government expenditures and electoral outcomes
in Colombia to analyze both voting behavior and the pre-electoral dynamics of
government spending. I suggest a correspondence between fiscal data and the
conceptual division of expenditures into targeted and non-targeted spending. I
find that targeted spending grows and non-targeted spending contracts in the
year leading to an election. Consistent with this result, I find that Colombian
voters reward pre-election increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents
who run high deficits when the election approaches.
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Central Bank Institutions and




Central Banks as Government Appointed Committees
1.1 Motivation
The question of what is the optimal institutional design of an independent Cen-
tral Bank (CB) has been of great interests to legislators, central bankers, and
academics alike. One of the sticky points is how much independence should the
CB be given. Although the importance of CB independence is widely recognized,
there is also ample agreement around the idea that the CB should not be com-
pletely isolated from the government. This is in part due to the need for harmony
between monetary and fiscal policy, but also because the participation of publicly
elected officials in all policy decisions is at the core of democratic systems. The
dilemma is how to maintain the desired link with the government, while giving
the CB enough independence to alleviate ties between monetary policy and the
electoral cycle, and to reduce inflation bias.
In practice, such dilemma is frequently addressed by placing the design of
monetary policy in the hands of a committee of central bankers, and giving
the government some power over the appointment of its members. The idea is
that, while these appointment powers create a tie between the government and
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the CB, the larger set of decision-making mechanisms and appointment rules
available under a committee arrangement can be exploited to make policy more
independent from government’s pressures than it would be under a single central
banker. In other words, for any given position of each individual member, the
mechanisms through which positions are aggregated can be optimally designed
to reduce the influence of the government.
Although this argument points to certainly important advantages of commit-
tee designs, it fails to recognize that central bankers embedded in this type of
setting may in fact not behave as they would in the absence of government ap-
pointments, or within monolithic institutions. That is, the positions of individual
members are not “given”. This paper brings into the picture the potential effects
of collective decision-making and government appointments on the choices of each
individual central banker. Accounting for this dimension makes clear that not
under all circumstances a committee structure indeed helps in isolating mone-
tary policy from the electoral cycle and reducing inflation bias. In particular, the
size of the committee and the fraction of members over whose appointment the
government has influence are key determinants of the effects of collective decision-
making. My results contribute to the debate on the optimal institutional design
of the CB, shedding light on the question of how to obtain the benefits of CB
independence without fully isolating the CB from the government.
The introduction of collective decision-making and government appointment
powers can affect the incentives faced by central bankers in ways that are par-
ticularly acute when informational asymmetries give rise to reputation concerns.
As previous literature has pointed out, central bankers may want to build a rep-
utation for the CB being tough on inflation. But this is not the only source for
3
reputation building incentives when appointments to the CB are a privilege of
the government. In fact, a central banker may care about the perception the gov-
ernment has about him (how close are his preferences to those of the government,
how loyal to the government he is) because such perception affects his chances of
being reappointed1. Hence, a central banker may want to build a reputation of
being close to the government.
Moreover, how these reputation building incentives play into a central banker’s
decisions depends crucially on whether decisions are monolithic or collective. In
particular, reappointment probabilities are affected by the government’s percep-
tions about each individual central banker, while inflation expectations are af-
fected by the public’s perception about the CB as a whole. In a monolithic
environment, the central banker and the CB are the same entity, so there is no
difference between the CB reputation and that of the policy-maker. But under a
committee there is a dichotomy between the individual reputation of each member
and the collective reputation of the CB. Furthermore, since the vote of a central
banker may not be reflected in the actual policy, each member knows that his
vote will only have a limited effect on the collective reputation of the CB. Hence,
under committee decisions the incentive to show closeness to the government can
override the incentive to build a reputation of toughness for the CB, as well as
other considerations. If this is the case, the idea that a committee design limits
the influence of the government on monetary policy may be wrong.
Motivated by these considerations, I study how the reputation building in-
1As an example, Ersenkal et al. (1985), find that monetary base in the U.S. expands faster
in the months that precede the decision of whether a Federal Reserve Board chairman will be
reappointed.
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centives faced by central bankers are affected by the government’s appointment
powers and by collective decision-making. I frame my analysis in a two-period
model that falls in the tradition of Barro and Gordon (1983), in which I introduce
the possibility of endogenous reappointments of CB members. In this setting I
address the tension between the CB collective reputation and each member’s in-
dividual reputation, as discussed above. While a central banker’s concern about
the reputation of the CB can reduce his temptation to inflate, his concern to
show loyalty to the government in order to be reappointed creates a channel for
the government to influence policy.
I show that, compared to a single central banker, a committee design has the
potential to both increase the importance of building a reputation for the CB
being tough on inflation, and reduce the importance of reappointment consider-
ations. The realization of this potential, however, depends crucially on specific
features of the committee design, in particular its size and the fraction of mem-
bers the government can replace from one period to the next. An increase in
the fraction of members to be replaced reduces the relevance of past inflation for
future expectations of inflation, diminishing the ability of reputation consider-
ations to reduce inflation bias. It also increases the risk that a central banker
will be removed from office if believed to be of a different type than the govern-
ment, increasing the incentives to follow the government’s preferred policy. On
the other hand, an increase in the size of the committee reduces the ability any
single central banker has to affect actual policy, thus increasing the importance
central bankers give to influencing reappointment rather than choosing policy.
The paper is divided in six sections , including this introduction. In section
1.2, I review some relevant literature, and discuss the contributions of this paper.
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Section 1.3 discusses the general setting of my model, and solves the problem
of a central banker. Section 1.4 compares how that solution differs between the
cases of a single central banker and a board. Section 1.5 introduces government
appointments. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 A little perspective: literature on govern-
ment appointments and committee central
banks
The effects of government appointments on monetary policy, as chosen by a com-
mittee, have been previously studied by Lohman (1997) andWaller (1989). These
papers extend Alesina’s (1987) model of partisan cycles in monetary policy and
output, to account for committee decision-making and government appointments
to the CB. A central assumption is that each government can change some mem-
bers of the CB during its term, and it appoints central bankers who belong to its
own party. The only source of uncertainty is which party will win the following
elections; the types of central bankers are not private information, and as a result
each member of the committee always votes for the policy preferred by his politi-
cal principal. The basic result of this literature is that a well designed committee
can reduce inflation cycles because it renders more stable CB preferences than a
single central banker arrangement2. This implies less uncertainty about future
decisions of the central bank, and therefore ends up reducing output cycles as
2This literature does not have much to say about inflation bias: since there is perfect
information about the preferences of all policy-makers, inflation always reflects the “median
type” in the committee.
6
well. Waller (1989) shows that lengthening the terms of central bankers (reduc-
ing the fraction of members changed at each point) further reduces those cyclical
variations, because it implies even less uncertainty about the future preferences
of the CB. The decentralization of appointments is shown to have a similar effect
by Lohman (1997). The results in these papers support the informal arguments
that, in many countries, led to the adoption of boards to direct the CB. Both
official statements and other accounts about the reasons that led to this type of
institutional design in many countries argue that the preferences of a committee
CB will evolve more slowly than those of its single-member counterpart, and will
therefore be less subject to the influence of the political cycle3.
The absence of informational asymmetries in this literature implies that a
central banker always behaves like his political principal. As a result, the only
difference with the case where the government chooses monetary policy is the
committee nature of policy-making. In other words, CB independence plays no
role in these models, and the only effect of a committee structure is to aggregate
the otherwise unchanged votes of central bankers. My approach in this paper
is fundamentally different, although not necessarily conflicting: I focus on how
a committee affects the decisions of central bankers, rather than on how those
3For instance, the committee design of the Colombian Central Bank is explained in the
Bank’s Website as follows : “This system guarantees continuity in Bank policy while safe-
guarding it from the influences of political change, thus ensuring planning more in view of the
long-term and garnering greater credibility with the public” (El Nuevo ordenamiento del Banco
y su Junta Directiva, in www.banrep.gov.co). On other front, Waller (1989) documents how
several historians of the U.S. Federal Reserve “argue that the board structure of the Federal Re-
serve Board of Governors was, in fact, chosen specifically to minimize the influence of partisan
politics on the setting of monetary policy” (pp 422-423)
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decisions are aggregated. Moreover, there is a rationale for CB independence
in my model, since the government is assumed to be immune to the reputation
concerns that restrain the inflationary temptations of central bankers.
Another strand of literature (Faust, 1996, Dal Bó, 2002) documents the ability
of a committee structure to reduce inflation bias, in the absence of reputation
concerns. These papers take advantage of the fact that a committee provides
flexibility to aggregate the positions of its members in different ways. The basic
starting point is that the inflation rate preferred by the median voter is too high,
in the sense of imposing inflation costs without generating benefits from surprise
inflation. They show that an optimal decision mechanism can be designed, such
that the monetary policy chosen by a board is less subject to inflation bias than
the one preferred by the median voter. In Faust’s model, monetary policy is
the result of bargaining between members of the CB. Inflation bias is reduced
if the representation of anti-inflation groups is disproportionately large, relative
to their representation in society. Meanwhile, in Dal Bó’s model central bankers
vote over policy choices. He shows that a less inflationary balance of preferences
can be achieved if an optimal supermajority rule is used to choose policy4. The
4Dal Bó’s discussion relies on the assumption that CB committees are large enough to be
representative of the distribution of types in society. Given my results this assumption not only
is unrealistic, but it also ignores that a large committee creates perverse incentives for central
bankers. Moreover, in the supermajority rule he proposes, central bankers vote over status-
quo optimal inflation and a “reform inflation” that is chosen by the majority. The majority
is supposed to choose a reform inflation level different from the one preferred by the median
voter, realizing that only in this way will a supermajority be obtained in the second round.
This assumption requires a large amount of coordination among voters, that I find difficult to
justify if the committee, as assumed in the paper, is large.
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supermajority rule ensures that the pivotal voter is more conservative than the
median voter. My results differ from these papers in that, in my model, an
appropriately designed board can reduce the inflation bias even when the pro-
inflation types are in command of the CB. This arises because, in my model,
reputation concerns affect the choices of these “weaker” types, and a committee
structure can make reputation more relevant.
Finally, the effects of a committee design on the reputation building incentives
of central bankers are addressed by A. Sibert (1999). In her model, as is the
case in this paper, the fact that a central banker’s vote may not be reflected
in the policy outcome changes the incentives to build a reputation. However,
she abstracts from the mechanisms for appointing central bankers which, as this
paper shows, are a key determinant of the importance central bankers give to
reputation-building considerations. Moreover, Sibert’s model assumes that the
public obtains and uses information about individual votes in the CB, while in
this paper the idea that individual votes are observed only imperfectly is pivotal
to the concept of “collective reputation”. My contention is that people may
form expectations based on the actual policy even if individual voting records
are available, due to reasons such as the lower cost of observing policy compared
to investigating individual votes. Sibert’s paper does analyze the case in which
voting records are not published, but my results differ from hers even in this
case, given my consideration of the reappointment process. My idea of collective
reputation is closer to that proposed by Tirole (1996), for whom the reputation
of an organization differs from the reputation of each member because the output
of the latter is observed only imperfectly.
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1.3 Model: General setting
The model I use follows the tradition of the Barro-Gordon model (1983), which is
probably the most standard framework to model the choices of the Central Bank.
My analysis relies on previous models of reputation building by the monetary
authority (Backus and Driffill, 1985; Barro, 1986). I begin by studying the choice
of monetary policy without imposing a specific institutional structure, and derive
a general solution to the problem of a central banker. Even without further
institutional detail, my general approach differs from the traditional setting in
that, as in many CB’s around the world, a central banker’s term can be extended.
That is, a central banker can be reappointed. I will later I specialize the general
solution obtained in this section, analyzing the form it takes under different
specifications of the institutional setting: board vs single central bankers, and
government appointments vs. random appointments.
1.3.1 The preferences of central bankers
Consider a two-period economy with a Central Bank (CB) that rules over mone-
tary policy. The CB is assumed to be independent from the government, in that
the latter does not participate in the choice of monetary policy. However, under
some of the institutional arrangements I consider, the government is given the
role of choosing central bankers.
I assume that the CB has perfect control over the inflation rate, π, which
summarizes monetary policy in the model. The preferences of central bankers
reflect the costs and potential benefits of inflation. Inflation and inflation vari-
ability impose costs on society, for instance because they are associated with
distortions of relative prices. At the same time, unanticipated inflation generates
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benefits, which can reflect different factors. On one side is the familiar Phillips
curve mechanism which, in its simplest form, points that unexpected inflation
reduces real wages in the presence of inflexible nominal wage contracts, stimulat-
ing the demand for labor. Moreover, unexpected inflation reduces the real value
of outstanding nominal liabilities, generating gains to borrowers such as the gov-
ernment. As a result, central bankers derive utility from low and stable inflation,
but they also value inflation surprises. Furthermore, central bankers may not be
purely altruistic, in which case they also give some value to being in office.
The importance given to reducing inflation, relative to other objectives, differs
across central bankers. There are many reasons why such heterogeneity can arise.
In Alesina’s (1987) model, for instance, it is the reflection of ideological differences
and/or party affiliation. It can also capture skepticism on the part of some policy
makers about their ability to exploit inflation-output trade-offs (which could in
turn give them the ability to commit to a monetary rule, as in Barro’s 1986
model); or it could result from central bankers representing interests that are
affected by inflation in different ways, such as borrowers and lenders (Faust, 1996).
The implication, in any case, is that some central bankers have more incentives
than others to reduce inflation, relative to generating inflationary surprises. I
assume that central bankers come in two types, which I call hawks and doves.
Hawks give more importance than doves to fighting inflation. I assume that the
type of a central banker is his private information, which will raise reputation
considerations.








π2t − c(πt − πet)− b ∗ oit
¤
(1.1)
where the superindex d refers to a dove, πt is the inflation rate in period t, πet is
the public’s expectation of inflation for period t, βi ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor,
and oit is 1 if i is in office in period t, and 0 otherwise. I allow the discount factor
βi to vary across individual bankers, so that different dove central bankers may
care more or less about the future implications of their choices; βi is characterized
by a cumulative density function F (βi). The parameters c and b (where c > 0
and b ≥ 0), capture the value given by a dove policy maker to, respectively,
generating inflation surprises and being in office (relative to reducing inflation).
Central bankers face uncertainty that stems from two sources. First, if mon-
etary policy is chosen by a committee, each central banker faces uncertainty
about the types of his fellow committee members. The other source of uncer-
tainty for a central banker comes from the possibility that the central banker
is not reappointed for period 2. Although I will consider different scenarios for
how reappointment is decided, in all of them reappointment is uncertain from
the perspective of period 1.
The first term of loss function (1.1) implies that a dove central banker cares
about driving inflation to its target value of zero (a different target level could
be assumed without changing the basic results). The convex functional form of
this term captures inflation stabilization incentives.
The second term reflects a dove’s incentives to generate inflation surprises. As
in the original formulation of the Barro-Gordon model, I assume a linear func-
tional form. This assumption has the shortcoming of ignoring potential output
stabilization incentives, which could be affected by the institutional environment.
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However, it makes the problem of the central banker more tractable; this is im-
portant in the context of this paper, because the simultaneous introduction of
government appointments, committee decision-making, and possible reappoint-
ments expands considerably the set of possible states of the world that a central
banker must consider5.
Notice that, for any individual i serving as central banker in period one,
oit=1 = 1. Moreover, defining ri such that ri = 1 if i is reappointed for period
2 and ri = 0 otherwise6, one can write E(oit=2) = Pr(ri = 1). To simplify the
notation, I will drop the time subindexes, and indicate period 2 variables with a
0 mark. A dove’s loss function can, therefore, be rewritten as:
Ldi = E
©
π2 − c(π − πe) + βi
£
(π0)2 − c(π0 − πe0)
¤ª
− b [1 + βiPr(ri = 1)] (1.2)
What is important to note from this loss function is that the choices of a
dove central banker in the first period affect not only his current losses, but also
his expected losses for period 2. One channel for these intertemporal effects is
the well known incentive to build a good reputation for the CB (Backus and
Driffill, 1985; Barro, 1986). High inflation in the first period sends the signal to
the public that the members of the CB are dove with high probability, and are
therefore likely to chose high inflation in period 2. In other words, high π affects
the reputation of the CB, increasing future inflation expectations (captured by
πe0). Since πe0 enters loss function (1.2), consideration of the CB’s reputation
5Some interesting consequences of CB collective decision-making for the ability of the mon-
etary authority to stabilize output, although in more restricted contexts, are analyzed by Dal
Bó (2000) and Waller (1989).
6Later I allow the government to choose r.
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makes a dove central banker wary of increasing π in the first period.
Consider, for instance, the case of a single central banker. The public uses
π to make inferences about the type of the central banker who was in office in
period 1. If high π is observed, they assign a higher probability to the central
banker being dove than if π was low. In case the central banker is reappointed
for period 2, these inferences affect πe0.
Importantly, this paper’s focus on government appointments to the CB cre-
ates an additional link between today’s policy and tomorrow’s expected losses.
In particular, if the decision to reappoint the central banker lies with the gov-
ernment, the central banker’s choice of policy in period 1 is likely to affect his
chances of reappointment. Reappointment obviously affects the central banker’s
expected utility from being in office in period 2, captured by b. But further than
that, his assessment of the probability of staying in office also affects his expecta-
tions about both π0 and πe0 (that is, π0 and πe0 also depend on ri, as will become
clear). As a result, when choosing π, the central banker must take into account
the potential effects of his choice on his chances of reappointment. Under the
assumption that the government favors partisan appointments, central banker i
has incentives to choose the policy preferred by the government to increase his
chances of remaining in office.
In short, when choosing policy in period 1, a dove central banker takes into
account the potential effect of his choice on three different factors: 1) current
inflation, and therefore the central banker’s current welfare, 2) next period ex-
pected inflation, and 3) his chances of reappointment. Simply put, a dove central
banker has a preference for generating an inflation surprise in period 1, but may
be discouraged from doing so because high inflation damages the reputation of
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the CB, increasing future expectations of inflation. He may also avoid high infla-
tion if this damages his chances of being reappointed, or stick to it if the opposite
is true.
As for hawk central bankers, I assume they care solely about driving inflation
to zero in the given period, so that a hawk always chooses zero inflation. This
assumption is, obviously, extreme, and it is adopted for simplicity. As will become
clear later, together with the absence of incentives for output stabilization, it
reduces the space of possible policies to a binary one. Although it has the cost
of precluding signaling by hawks, it should not affect my conclusions since the
focus of this paper is how the institutional environment shapes the incentives of
those central bankers who are subject to reputation considerations.
A central banker’s choice variable is his vote over π, which is equivalent to the
actual policy in the case of a single central banker, but not necessarily so under
a committee arrangement. Given the preferences outlined before a hawk central
banker votes for π = 0 in both periods. However, the problem of a dove is more
involved. Solving backwards, in period 2 a dove central banker votes for the rate






In period 1, meanwhile, he also considers the implications of his vote on the
perceptions of others about his type. These affect both future expected inflation
and, potentially, his chances of being reappointed. Notice that, since hawks only
vote for π = 0, voting for any rate different from π = 0 will reveal i as a dove
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to those observing his vote7. As a result, a dove central banker will consider two
possible votes for period 1: π = 0 and π = πd, where the latter is his preferred
vote among those that reveal his type. Inflation is thus π = 0 or π = πd in both
periods.
Before solving for a dove’s optimal choice, let us define the structures of time
and information.
1.3.2 Timing and information
The timing of events, summarized in Figure 1.1, is as follows. There are two
periods, t = 1, and t = 2. Each period t is divided into three “subperiods”,
t−, t, t+. At t− central bankers are appointed (e.g. by the government): they can
be newcomers, or, for t = 2, central bankers that were in office in t = 1 and were
reappointed. At t the public forms inflation expectations8. At t+ the CB chooses
π, which is observed by all players.
As for the information structure, in any given period there is uncertainty
about the type of the central banker in office (central bankers, if the CB is a
committee), which is known only to himself. In period 1, only the unconditional
probability of a central banker being a dove (which I denote by φ) is known to the
7Even in the case of a committee, where his individual vote may not be observable to others,
voting for π 6= 0 could result in this alternative rate being chosen, which would reveal that there
are at least some dove members in the committee.
8Notice that, by assuming that expectations are formed only once within a central banker’s
term, I am implicitly imposing an equivalence between the length of a central banker’s term
and the length of nominal contracts. Although relaxing this assumption could have interesting
implications for the cycle of monetary policy within a central banker’s term, I will keep it

























Figure 1.1: Timing of events
public. Given the timing described above, however, in period 2 all players know
what policy was chosen in period 1. It is also known if a central banker is an
incumbent reappointed at the end of period 1, or a newcomer. This information
is used by the public to update beliefs about the types of period 2 central bankers,
and ultimately to form πe0.
1.3.3 Solving the problem of a dove central banker
Remember that in period 2 a dove central banker always chooses the policy that
minimizes his current losses, πd = c
2
. I go now back to discussing a dove’s problem
in period 1. Without loss of generality, I will address the problem of a specific
dove central banker, whom I index by i. I denote i’s vote (which equals actual
policy in the single central banker case) as vi ∈ {0, πd}. Since this vote can only
take the values of 0 and πd , the problem of dove central banker i in period 1 can
be rewritten as9:
9Here I use the facts that cπd = c
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L0 | vi, π = πd
¢¸
+Pr(π = 0 | vi) [βiE (L0 | vi,π = 0)]
where













Pr p(π0 = πd | π) | vi
¤
− bPr(ri = 1 | vi)
and I have abstracted from constant terms. I use Prp(π0 = πd | π) to designate
the probability assigned by the public to π0 = πd , given the realization of π. I
use this notation to differentiate the probability assigned by the public to a given
outcome from the probability assigned by the central banker, who knows his type
and can therefore use this additional information. The term in Prp(π0 = πd | π)
comes from the fact that πe0 = πd ∗ Prp(π0 = πd | π).
Note that i is solving this problem before observing the votes of his colleagues
(in the committee case), and before knowing whether he will be reappointed.
Moreover, he does not know the types of his fellow committee members. These
sources of uncertainty explain why a member of a committee does not know
with certainty what π will be given his vote. They also explain the expectation




Before proceeding with the discussion, I will introduce some notation that
facilitates reading the rest of the paper. For any outcome x, I will use ∆Pr(x) ≡
Pr(x | vi = πd)−Pr(x | vi = 0) to denote the impact of i’s vote on that outcome.
More specifically, I define:
∆Pr(π = πd) ≡ Pr(π = πd | vi = πd)− Pr(π = πd | vi = 0),
∆Pr(ri = 1) ≡ Pr(ri = 1 | vi = πd)− Pr(ri = 1 | vi = 0), and
∆Pr(π0 = πd) ≡ Pr(π0 = πd | v0i = πd)− Pr(π0 = πd | v0i = 0).
Note from the last line that ∆Pr(π0) is defined as a function of v0i rather than
vi, where v0i is period 2’s vote of i or his replacement if he is not reappointed.
Moreover, I also denote E
£
Pr p(π0 = πd | π) | vi
¤
≡ Evi Pr p(π0 = πd | π).
Given the above discussion, dove central banker i chooses vi = 0 if and only
if L(vi = 0) < L(vi = πd) and vi = πd if the opposite is true11. The following
proposition summarizes the choices of dove central banker i, including the con-
dition under which he chooses vi = 0 in the first period (the transformed form of
L(vi = 0) < L(vi = π
d)).
Proposition 1 In period 2 a dove central banker i chooses vi = πd. In period 1
he chooses vi = 0 if the following condition holds:
E
£
Pr p(π0 = πd | π) | vi
¤
= Pr(ri = 1 | vi)Pr p(π0 = πd | π, ri = 1) + Pr(ri = 0 | vi)Pr p(π0 =
πd | π, ri = 1)










+ (1− φ)∆Pr(π0 = πd)
¤
> ∆Pr(π = πd)
(1.4)
Proof. See appendix A
Condition (1.4) is key to understanding the incentives faced by a dove central
banker. It indicates that a dove may vote for zero inflation in period 1 if the
benefits from this choice exceed the costs. The top row reflects the benefits of
voting for π = 0 in terms of CB reputation, derived from the fact that low
current inflation would reduce future expectations of inflation and therefore open
the door for future inflation surprises. This term is multiplied by ∆Pr(π = πd),
indicating that vi = 0 will only generate reputation gains if i’s vote is reflected
in actual policy. I will call Pr p(π0 = πd | π = πd) − Pr p(π0 = πd | π = 0) the
reputation factor, which generates an incentive to vote for low inflation. On the
other hand, I will refer to i’s ability to affect policy, captured by ∆Pr(π = πd),
as the representation factor. This factor indicates that i will be concerned about
the costs his vote may impose in terms of the CB’s reputation only if that vote
is represented by the policy .
The middle row captures the benefits of vi = 0 in terms of reappointment,
since −∆Pr(ri = 1) is the gain in reappointment probability from choosing
vi = 0. Note that ∆Pr(ri = 1) can have any sign, depending on how reap-
pointment is chosen. Although reappointment will be discussed in detail below,
it is important to note that, if appointments are in the hands of the government,
20
this term is likely to imply an incentive to vote for the government’s preferred
rate (that is, ∆Pr(ri = 1) is negative if the government is hawk and positive it if




+ (1− φ)∆Pr(π0 = πd)
¤
, gives the value
of reappointment, where φ is the unconditional probability of a central banker
being a dove. As noted before, this value is not only given by the opportunistic
reward to being in office, b, but also by i’s desire to shape policy according to his
preferences. This is key, as central bankers’ incentives to increase their chances of
reappointment are frequently dismissed with the argument that central bankers
are not opportunistic individuals. This model makes the point that even an al-
truistic central banker wants to remain in office, so that his beliefs about what is
optimal for social welfare are taken into account in the design of future policies.
Finally, the term to the right of the inequality sign captures the fact that
vi = 0 is costly from the point of view of period 1, since in the absence of
considerations about the future a dove central banker would prefer π = πd to
π = 0. As was the case with the reputation incentive, this current loss is only
incurred if i’s vote is reflected in the actual policy, so representation also plays a
role in this case.
In short, vi = 0 can only result if reputation and reappointment considerations
for the future overcome the current costs zero inflation imposes on a dove central
banker. This requires high reputation (and/or reappointment) benefits from vi =
0, and also that central banker i assign a high value to the future. The latter
requirement is reflected in the fact that condition (1.4) can only be satisfied for
large enough values of βi.
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1.3.4 Expectations and equilibrium choices
When forming expectations of inflation for period 2, individuals know that central
bankers correctly represent their types in that period. That is, they know that
doves will vote for π0 = πd and hawks will vote for π0 = 0, and therefore Pr p(π0 =
πd | π) depends on people’s beliefs about the types of period 2 central bankers.
For a newly appointed central banker, past policy provides no information, so
the public assigns a probability φ that he is dove (where φ was defined above as
the unconditional probability that a central banker is dove). For central bankers
that were reappointed from period 1, however, the public updates beliefs using
Bayesian updating. If i is reappointed for period 2, the public will assign:
Pr P (i is dove | π) = Pr(π | i is dove) Pr(i is dove)
Pr(π)
(1.5)
Moreover, letting w = Pr(vi = πd | i is dove)
Pr(π | i is dove) = w ∗ Pr(π | vi = πd) + (1− w) Pr(π | vi = 0) (1.6)
In equilibrium, w should reflect the optimal strategy of dove central bankers,
as presented in proposition 1. Hence, using condition (1.4), w is given by
w =
½















Equation 1.7 reflects the fact, already discussed, that for small values of βi
i chooses vi = πd. It is important to note that w summarizes the solution
to this problem, since it represents the choices of dove central bankers (and the
choices of hawks are trivial). Also, the solution to this problem involves the public
forming expectations rationally given the optimal strategies of central bankers,
and central bankers optimally choosing their votes on policy given the public’s
beliefs. The former is reflected in (1.5). The latter is satisfied because central
bankers know the mechanism of expectations formation just described, and take
it into account when evaluating Pr p(π0 = πd | π).
It is important to point out that any given central banker does not play a
mixed strategy. That is, i either chooses vi = 0 with probability 1 or vi = πd
with probability 1. Although this and the solution to i’s problem are known to
the public, the public can only make an evaluation of the probability that a given
member chooses vi = πd, because they do not observe the individual βi. Different
discount rates capture sources of heterogeneity across central bankers other than
their relative preferences towards fighting inflation12. Note also that any given
central banker faces a problem similar to that of the public, in that he cannot
observe the types of his colleagues. Therefore, he also uses w to evaluate the
probability that any other dove central banker chooses vi = πd.
The discussion above presents a general characterization of the equilibrium
choices of central bankers. I will now analyze what these conditions imply in
terms of the optimal institutional design of the CB. I will present alternative
12If all dove central bankers were identical, w would be either 1 or 0. In this case, reappoint-
ment incentives are the only reason a dove central banker would ever choose low inflation (if
w = 0 all members are voting for the same rate, so any given member knows his vote does not
define policy, i.e. the representation factor is 0).
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institutional settings and study the choices of central bankers under each of these
environments. The strategy will be to focus on condition (1.4), and study how
institutional design affects the different incentives faced by central bankers (sum-
marized by the three key concepts of reputation, reappointment, and representa-
tion, discussed above), and ultimately how they affect w. When discussing the
convenience of one or another institutional design, I will be implicitly assuming
that CB institutions should minimize both inflation bias and the government’s
influence over monetary policy. These two goals are frequent motivations for
placing monetary policy in the hands of an independent CB, and I here simply
take them as given13.
1.4 The institutional dimension I: collective de-
cision making
Consider first the case for a committee-based CB. As a first approximation, I
will isolate the analysis of collective decision-making from the consideration of
government appointments. I do so by assuming throughout this section that a
central banker’s reappointment is exogenously given and independent of his vote
in the first period, so that ∆Pr(ri = 1) = 0. The condition under which a central
13Although I do not provide formal proof that reducing inflation and the gvoernment’s influ-
ence is optimal, my assumptions about the preferences of central bankers are in fact consistent
with social losses that are increasing in inflation and inflation variability, under the very plausi-
ble assumption that the preferences of central bankers are similar to those of other individuals
in society. Note that political pressures constitute a source of undesirable variability of mone-
tary policy, in that the political cycle would impose changes in policy not warranteed by shocks
to economic fundamentals.
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banker votes for π = 0 (see proposition 1) can thus be written:
2βiEvi
¡
Pr p(π0 = πd | π = πd)− Pr p(π0 = πd | π = 0)
¢
> 1 (1.8)
Note that not only the terms involving reappointment incentives disappear,
but the ∆Pr(π = πd) term does not enter (1.8) either. The reason for this is
that, without government appointments, the votes of central bankers only mat-
ter if they affect policy; they do not have any costs or benefits by themselves.
As a result, any ∆Pr(π = πd) > 0 suffices for policy considerations to be the
only factors in a central banker’s choice. This does not mean that representation
ceases to play any role, as we will see when discussing the implications of a com-
mittee design, but it does imply that representation does not affect the relative
importance of reputation-building incentives, compared to other considerations.
Given condition (1.8), reputation building is at the heart of a central banker’s
choice in the case without government appointments: vi = 0 is chosen if and only
if the reputation gain from low inflation is high enough to overcome the current
loss π = 0 imposes on a dove central banker. It is thus the case that inflation bias
is minimized when the impact of inflation on the CB reputation is maximized.
With this in mind, I will analyze how reputation considerations are affected by
specific characteristics of a committee-based CB, such as its size and the fraction
of members being replaced in each period. As a benchmark, I start by studying
the case of a single central banker, and then move to the committee case.
1.4.1 Single central banker
Suppose there is a single central banker who, after his first term in office, is
reappointed with exogenous probability p (Pr(r = 1) = p). One may see 0
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and 1 as the only plausible values for p, but I will allow intermediate values for
the purpose of comparing with the committee case, and later with government
appointments.
With monolithic decisions, a central banker’s vote is perfectly reflected in the
policy choice and Pr p(π0 = πd | π, ri = 1) = Pr(i is dove| π). Public beliefs about
period 1’s central banker, who I will still call i, are given by
Pr(i is dove | π)=
½
1 if π = πd
(1−w)φ
1−wφ if π = 0
¾
(1.9)
where I have used the Bayesian updating mechanism captured by equation
(1.5). Hence, the reputation cost of choosing πd is reflected in the fact that Pr(i
is dove| π) is larger when period 1 inflation is high. Moreover, this cost is only
perceived if the central banker is reappointed. If he is replaced by a newcomer,
people do not give any importance to past policy in setting inflation expectations,
and
¡
Pr p(π0 = πd | π = πd)− Pr p(π0 = πd | π = 0)
¢
= 0.
Given these elements, during period 1 this dove single central banker can







where, again, the left hand side reflects the incentive to build a reputation
for the CB being tough on inflation. Zero inflation can only be supported by the
dove central banker if βi is large enough, φ is low enough and the probability
people assign to doves voting for high inflation, w, is high. βi increases the value
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given to reducing future expected inflation. Meanwhile, with large φ’s, people
assign a high probability that the central banker is dove to begin with, so it is
hard to lead them to believe the opposite through the choices of π. Finally, a
high value of w implies large reputation gains from choosing low inflation, since
people know doves are very unlikely to choose π = 0, and therefore assign a low
probability that someone who chose low inflation is dove.
The key element to keep in mind, however, is the fact that i’s reputation
is only relevant for next period’s expected inflation if i is reappointed. This is
the reason why the reputation incentive, given by the LHS of condition (1.10), is
increasing in p. A single central banker thus only cares about building reputation
if there is some positive probability that he will be reappointed for next period.
Interestingly, a characteristic of single central banker arrangements is precisely
that the term of the CB expires at some point, different from committee designs
where the terms of central bankers can be staggered to ensure that at every point
in time there is some continuity. If we considered period 1 to be the last (only)
period in office of our dove single central banker (such that p = 0), he would not
choose π = 0 no matter what values other parameters took.
1.4.2 A committee Central Bank
Suppose now that monetary policy is decided by a committee, whose members
vote over the possible policy choices. What makes collective and monolithic
decision-making different from the point of view of a central banker? Without
government appointments, there are three major dimensions along which differ-
ences exist: the power of each central banker to affect policy, the potential for
reputation building and the importance central bankers assign to it, and the
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available sets of rules for appointments to the CB.
First, when policy is decided by the votes of several individuals, the vote of
any given member may not be reflected in the actual policy choice. This is the
representation concept discussed above: a given member may not be represented
by policy. Although, as captured by condition 1.8, representation does not affect
the relative importance of reputation when reappointments are random, it does
have an effect on how past inflation affects expectations of future inflation. Put
simply, past policy does not reveal individual votes, and therefore contains less
information about the types of each member than it does in the single central
banker case. One can think of this in terms of policy revealing only the votes of
the majority. As a result, the amount of information relevant to learn the types
of central bankers that is contained in past policy is decreasing in the level of
representation.
Second, the incentives faced by central bankers in terms of building a rep-
utation for the CB can be fundamentally different when policy is chosen by a
committee. The key assumption in this paper is that the public forms expecta-
tions of future inflation based on past policy, rather than on individual votes of
central bankers. This is captured by the assumption that the public observes π,
but not the individual vi. In some of the literature (e.g. Sibert, 1999), a similar
feature appears in the assumption that individual votes are not disclosed, or are
disclosed only with a lag. However, the public may base expectations only on
past policies even if individual votes are disclosed in the CB’s public statements,
and it is my view that this is a better representation of reality. On one side,
while information about monetary policy choices makes it to the headlines of the
mass media outlets, the positions of individual central bankers receive less atten-
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tion, often restricted to specialized media. This creates costs that may prevent
the public from getting information about individual votes at the CB. Moreover,
tracking the behavior of each individual member adds one more layer to the, as
we will see, already sophisticated calculations involved in forming inflation ex-
pectations. It seems relevant to question whether the general public, or even the
players involved in wage setting, analyze every policy decision with such high
level of sophistication.
In terms of reputation building incentives, the idea that the public forms
expectations based on policy outcomes rather than individual votes implies that
inflation expectations depend on the collective reputation of the CB. As a result,
central banker i’s vote can damage the CB’s reputation and affect future expected
inflation even if he is not reappointed. A committee design has therefore the
potential, through this channel, to increase the importance central bankers give
to protecting the CB’s reputation.
Finally, in terms of reappointment mechanisms, a committee arrangement
provides a flexibility that cannot be matched by single central banker designs.
The point is simply that for any maximum period a single central banker can
stay in office, a committee can be designed to outlive that maximum length14.
In particular, the rules of the committee can be such that at any given point in
14More generally, the key issue is that committee appointment rules can always imitate their
single central banker counterparts, but the opposite is not true. At any given point in time a
single central banker either stays or goes, so that p is either 0 or 1. A single central banker
that faces retirement (p = 0) can be imitated by a committee where the terms of all members
expire simultaneously. I the single central banker faces p = 1, an analogous committee would
have all members staying. However, a committee can also be designed to have some members
outlasting others, and this is a feature monolithic institutions cannot imitate.
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time at least some of the members remain in office. As discussed in the intro-
duction, this possibility is considered an important tool to guarantee continuity
in monetary policy-making, and it has been a key motivation for the adoption of
committee CB designs in many countries. I will therefore consider a committee
design that exploits it.
Let us now solve the problem of a dove central banker under a committee
arrangement. I assume there are n = 2z + 1 members in the committee, and
policies are decided by a simple majority rule, so that the inflation rate that
obtains z + 1 or more votes is adopted15. In particular, I assume that at the
end of period 1 exactly m members are removed from office, while the remaining
n−m are reappointed16. As a result, Pr(ri = 1) = 1− mn .
The public knows that in period 2 all doves in the committee vote for π = πd
while all hawks vote for π = 0. The probability that π0 = πd is therefore given by
the probability that z+1 or more members of the t = 2 committee are doves. The




of period 2 central bankers helped choose π. In other words, π contains





of the committee that serves in t = 2.
Letting i be a member in period 1, and public posterior beliefs be denoted by
Pr(i is dove| π = πd) ≡ φ+ and Pr(i is dove| π = 0) ≡ φ−, we obtain
15Notice the assumptions imply an odd-numbered committee, where we can abstract from tie-
breaking rules. I do not address here the question of optimal voting rules, which the literature
has now also started to look at (see, for instance, Dal Bó’s 2000 paper).
16This assumption closely matches the arrangement that characterizes the Colombian CB. It
is also close to other designs with staggered terms (like the cases of Mexico and Venezuela). In
many cases, these arrangements are mixed with caps on the number of times a given member
can be reappointed.
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where I have used an approximate form of Pr p(π0 = πd | π = πd) to simplify
the analysis (a formal derivation of equation (1.11) can be found in appendix A).
People’s beliefs about the “representative” central banker (i.e. φ+ and φ−) are
ruled by:
Pr(i is dove | π) = φw ∗ Pr(π | vi = π
d) + φ(1− w) Pr(π | vi = 0)
Pr(π)
(1.12)
Expression (1.11) captures the cost of high period 1 inflation in terms of the
collective reputation of the CB. This cost is increasing in the fraction of period
2 central bankers who also served in period 1, because π contains information
only about those n −m members. It also depends on a modified version of the
unconditional probability that the majority of members of the committee are
doves (the term preceded by the summation sign). Finally, it is proportional
to the effect that choosing high inflation has on the public’s beliefs about the





are generated with the Bayesian updating mechanism captured by equation (1.12)
(derived from (1.5) and (1.6)).
Note that the reputation loss captured by (1.11) depends crucially on the
size of the committee and the number of members who are replaced from one
period to the next, represented by the parameters n and m. An increase in the
fraction of members replaced, m
n
, reduces the amount of information relevant for
period 2 that is contained in period 1 policy. As a result, the reputation gain
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from avoiding high inflation in the first period is decreasing in m
n
, as the first
factor in equation (1.11) shows. On the other hand, representation is lower in
larger committees, as the impact of any individual member’s vote on the policy
choice decays when the size of the committee grows. The public therefore learns
less from policy about the types of individual members when the committee is
large, and this reduces the potential reputation gain to be obtained from choosing
low inflation in the first period. This point may be easier to understand if one
thinks of policy as revealing the votes of the majority, where the fraction of votes
that constitutes a majority is decreasing in the size of the committee. In this
sense, policy reveals less about the “average member” if the committee is larger.





is decreasing in the size of the committee17. Finally, n also has
a positive effect on the last term of (1.11). Notice an overall conflicting effect
of the committee size: while increases in n increase this last term and (1 − m
n
),
increasing the reputation cost of high π, they also generate an opposite effect
by reducing the amount of information contained in policy about the “average
member”.
Consider, for instance, the illustration of
¡
Pr p(π0 = πd | π = πd)− Pr p(π0 = πd | π = 0)
¢
for different values of m and n in Figure 1.2. The reputation loss is depicted as







Pr(π=πd)(1−Pr(π=πd)) , which makes the importance of the
representation factor (appearing explicitly in the numerator) evident . Note also that this term
does not depend on m, because it refers to the probability that a member who is known to have
been reappointed is dove.
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period, under the assumption that φ = 0.5 (i.e. an ex-ante equal proportion of
doves and hawks). For this and all other examples, using the notation (n, m
n
), I
will compare the case of (3, 1
3
) to the cases of (9, 1
9
) and (9, 3
9
). These cases are
interesting because in any pair of them n, m or m
n
are kept constant. In this and
all other figures I will use crosses to depict (3, 1
3






Going back to figure 1.2, note that if n grows keeping m constant, so that
the fraction of members replaced from one period to the next is reduced, and
π becomes more important as a signal about π0 (which is the reason why the
solid line is always above the crosses). This dominates other potential effects of
increases in the committee size, and as a result larger committees increase the
reputation loss from high inflation. However, if m
n
is kept constant a potential
negative effect of size on reputation shows up, as can be seen by comparing the
(3, 1
3
) and (9, 3
9
) cases when w is large. The negative effect may dominate only if
representation is sufficiently important. This is the case when w is large, because
then the separation between hawks and doves in maximized, and the public gives
greater importance to the choices of central bankers as reflection of their types.
Comparing this reputation loss to the case of a single central banker discussed
above shows both advantages and disadvantages of the committee design. On the
darker side, because representation is lower in the committee case, the impact of




in the committee case is smaller than the corresponding effect on beliefs in the
single case18. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the variety of appointment
arrangements available for a committee structure implies that it can always be
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Figure 1.2: Reputation-building incentive, no government
designed to outperform the single central banker in terms of the continuity of
policy from one period to the next (i.e. m
n
can be chosen as small as desired,
and turnover is smooth over time, while for a single central banker r must be 0
in some periods). In particular, if we compare the decision of a dove who knows
he will not be reappointed under the two arrangements, only in the committee
case is it possible that he will vote for low inflation. This stems from the fact
that even if he is not reappointed, his vote will impact the CB’s reputation. The
benefit of committee designs in terms of continuity, or “inertia”, of monetary
policy has been stressed before (e.g. Blinder 1998). This model points out that
the benefits of this greater persistence do not come only from welfare gains of
reducing the variability of inflation over time, but also from greater incentives for
policy makers to keep low inflation to protect the reputation of the CB. In net,
a committee can imply more reputation building than the single central banker
case, and increase the chances that low inflation is achieved. However, this is only
possible if the committee is appropriately designed in terms of the choice of m
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central banker votes for 
high inflation
5
Table 1.1: Case with no government
small m
n
to maximize the persistence of policy, but may also require a small
enough committee that past policy is considered informative about the types of
individual members.
Using equation (1.11) for the reputation loss, the condition under which cen-





















It is clear from this expression that a necessary condition for a dove cen-
tral banker to choose low inflation is that the reputation loss in equation (1.11)
exceeds 1
2
. From Figure 1.2, when φ = 0.5 this is only possible for some commit-
tee arrangements that exhibit low proportions of members replaced from period
to period. As further illustration, Table 1.1 shows the probability that a dove
chooses vi = πd for an example with φ = 0.5 and βi ∼ U(0, 1) (this probability is
equal to w, and it is calculated as in equation (1.7)). Only for low m
n
cases will
high βi doves vote for low inflation.
It is important to point that these results imply some benefits from the fact
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that the public does not observe individual votes. In particular, because inflation
expectations are based on past policy, the actions of a central banker can affect
the CB’s reputation even if he is not reappointed. This makes a central banker
wary of increasing inflation, even if he knew he would not be reappointed19.
This conclusion runs against A. Sibert’s (1999) result that publishing the votes
of central bankers reduces inflation bias. The reason for this difference is that
in her model the terms of central bankers are of fixed length, and dove central
bankers optimize solely over their horizon in office. Hence, either the central
banker knows he will be in office in period 2 for sure, in which case considerations
of reputation “even if he is not reappointed” are irrelevant, or he does not care
about the following period and hurting the CB’s reputation does not concern
him.
1.5 The institutional dimension II: government
appointments
Consider now the possibility that appointments (and reappointments) of central
bankers are not an exogenously determined event, but rather a choice of the gov-
ernment. The government appoints central bankers for period 1, decides whether
a central banker is reappointed at the end of that period, and chooses who will
replace a central banker who is not reappointed. The president has a seat (but
not a vote) on the Central Bank committee, so that he can observe the votes of
19I believe this is a fair representation of the actual decisions of central bankers, who are
usually highly concerned above eroding the credibility of the CB, even in their last terms in
office.
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the central bankers20. As a result, the reappointment of an incumbent central
banker is based on his vote for period 1 policy. As for the appointment of new-
comers (for period 1, or to replace a retired incumbent in period 2), there is no
relevant information available to distinguish one potential central banker from
another, so the government randomizes among all newcomers.
In practice, obviously, previous choices by incumbent central bankers are not
the only information governments use to choose central bankers. Governments
are likely to appoint newcomers on the basis of their party affiliation and their
previous performance in other areas of public service, or in the private sector.
Although this makes my assumption that new appointments are uninformed de-
cisions, it reflects the fact that this paper focuses on the effects of appointments
on the decisions of incumbent central bankers, which translates into a focus on
reappointments (as opposed to appointments of newcomers)21.
My modeling of the government is extremely simple. I abstract from the
political process that determines who the president is, and assume that the gov-
ernment’s type is known to everybody. I also focus on partisan appointments
by assuming that governments want to appoint members of their own type.
Since members who voted for high inflation reveal themselves as doves, a dove
government tries, subject to the institutional constraints in place, to reappoint
these members. For the same reason, a hawk government tries to replace central
20It is indeed frequent that the government participates in the meetings of the CB committees.
In many countries, this takes the form of the Finance Minister or a member of his staff being
also a member of the CB committee.
21For an analysis of the effects of partisan appointments of newcomers —in the absence of
reputation concerns—, see A. Alesina’s (1987) model, and subsequent extensions to the case of
committees (e.g. Waller, 1989; Lohman, 1997).
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bankers who voted for high inflation. This strategy on the part of the govern-
ment is consistent with previous models of government appointments to the CB.
For instance, given the abstraction from presidential elections and congressional
approvals of appointments to the CB, partisan appointments will arise in both
Waller’s (1992) and Havrilesky’s (1995, chapter 9) models.
How do government appointments affect the vote of a dove central banker?
Consider again the condition under which i chooses vi = 0, stated in proposition













As discussed, the first term on the LHS reflects the benefits in terms of the CB
reputation of choosing vi = 0, while the second term captures potential benefits
or losses stemming from the effect of vi on i’s chances of being reappointed. Given
the government’s reappointment strategy, voting for low inflation increases one’s
chances of being reappointed if the government is hawk, and decreases them if
the government is dove. This is reflected in the fact that ∆Pr(ri = 1) is negative
(positive) when the government is hawk (dove). The reappointment factor thus
creates incentives to vote for the rate preferred by the government.
Furthermore, notice from the second term that the value given to reappoint-
ment relative to other objectives is decreasing in ∆Pr(π = πd). This reflects the
fact that the probability of being reappointed depends on the central banker’s
vote while his other objectives are only affected by the actual choice of policy.
Thus, representation now plays the role of determining how much each central
banker values reappointment: if each vote has very low impact on the actual
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choice of policy, the decisions of central bankers will be mainly driven by reap-
pointment incentives. As a result, the influence of the government on monetary
policy is greatest when representation is lowest.
I now return now to the analysis of specific institutional designs, with em-
phasis on how they affect the balance between reappointment and reputation
considerations.
1.5.1 Government appointments and the case of a single
central banker
Let us start again with the case of a single central banker. Remember first that
the single central banker has perfect power over the choice of policy, so that
∆Pr(π = πd) = 1. Also, if g = {h, d} represents the type of the government,
then the general reappointment strategy discussed above implies:
∆Pr(r = 1 | g = d) = 1
∆Pr(r = 1 | g = h) = −1
The structure of reappointments affects the incentives faced by central bankers,
not only because they value reappointment, but also because current inflation
affects the reputation of the CB in the future only if the central banker is reap-



















> 1 if g = d
where I have used the fact that, if the central banker is not reappointed,
Pr p(π0 = πd | π) = φ for any π. Also, to keep matters as simple as possible, I
have assumed that the public’s beliefs about the type of the central banker are
not affected by the type of the government, so that the formula for Pr(i is dove
| π) is as in the case without government22 (equation (1.9)). In each case the first
term in the LHS of condition (1.15) represents the reputation loss from choosing
high inflation, while the rest of the LHS represents reappointment considerations.
As already discussed, the latter increase the incentives to choose vi = 0 if the
government is hawk and decreases them in the opposite case, since central bankers
value being reappointed.
It is clear from this expression that government appointments tie the choices
of dove central bankers to the preferences of the government, implying greater
probability of low inflation under hawk governments than under dove ones23. In
22If the public takes the decisions of the government into account, it will assign a higher
probability that members reappointed to a second period are of the same type of the govern-
ment who kept them in office. This diminishes the incentives to central bankers to follow the
government’s preferred policy (because the cost of high inflation in terms of future expectations
is higher under a dove government), but does not completely offset them.
23To see this clearly, rewrite the LHS of the condition as (1+φw)(1−φ)1−φw +
4b
c2 when g = h
and (1 − φ) − 4bc2 when g = d. Note that the expected reputation loss from choosing high
inflation may be larger under a dove government because the central banker will be reappointed
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fact, under the specific assumptions made here, a dove central banker will never
choose low inflation if the government is dove. From a broader perspective, when
appointments to the CB are a choice of the government, the political cycle can
be a source of variability for monetary policy. I turn now to the question of
how collective decision-making affects this link between monetary policy and the
preferences of the government.
1.5.2 Collective policy-making and government appoint-
ments
Consider now government appointments under in the committee case. As is by
now familiar, we need to worry about the effect of vi on the reputation-building
and reappointment incentives, represented respectively by the first and second











Since we are assuming that people’s beliefs about the types of period 1 cen-
tral bankers are not affected by the type of the government, reputation building
incentives are exactly as in the case without government. Future expected in-
flation does not depend on what members were reappointed, as the public has
no information on individual votes to distinguish between the types of those
reappointed and those replaced. Since reappointment does not affect expected
inflation, reputation-building incentives do not change with the type of the gov-
ernment; they did change in the single CB case because then whether the central
precisely after choosing high inflation . This diminishes the power of the government to dictate
monetary policy but does not completely overcome the reappointment incentive, as reflected in
the condition required for low inflation.
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banker was reappointed had an effect on expectations, and reappointment proba-
bilities for a given vote changed with the government’s type. Since the reputation
building incentives are not modified by the inclusion of the government, I will
start by studying the reappointment incentive, and ask how should the committee
be designed to minimize the power of the government to dictate monetary policy.
The overall effect on the incentive to choose vi = 0 will be addressed later.
As before, the committee has n members and m of them are to be changed
from period 1 to period 2. The president chooses which members will be replaced
and, given his preference to keep central bankers of his same type, he starts by
replacing members who voted for the policy he likes less. For instance, suppose
the government is hawk, and let V−g be the number of members who voted for
πd. If V−g ≥ m, the president randomly chooses m members among those who
voted πd. If on the contrary V−g < m, he replaces all members who voted πd and
randomly chooses the remaining m − V−g bankers to be replaced from the pool
of members that voted for low inflation. As a result, the central banker i faces
the following probabilities of being reappointed if the government is hawk:






Pr(ri = 1 | vi = 0, g = h) = min
½
1, 1− m− V−g
n− V−g
¾
The government’s strategy and implied probabilities when the government
is dove are equivalent to the ones just described, but with vi = 0 replaced by
vi = π
d, and V −g being the number of members who voter for π = 0. These
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reappointment strategies imply24:





















where ρ is the probability that any other member votes against the government’s
preferred rate (φw if the government is hawk and (1−φw) otherwise), the negative
sign is for the hawk government case, and x is the number of votes against the
government’s preferred rate from members other than i.
With these tools on hand, we can now study how the desire to be reappointed
affects a dove central banker’s strategy. Focus first on the reappointment value





+ (1− φ)∆Pr(π0 = πd)
¸
This can also be seen as the reappointment incentive if one’s vote were known to
affect policy (i.e. if ∆Pr(π = πd) = 1). The relationship between this expression
and parameters such as m
n
and n is difficult to see directly, but I will illustrate
it below. In general, this expression is increasing in the fraction of members to
be replaced, m
n
, which ultimately represents the fraction of members over whose
appointment the government has power. Moreover, this reappointment incentive
is much smaller than in the single central banker case, where the government
has perfect power over the permanence of the central banker (and where reap-
pointment is more valuable because it gives the central banker perfect power over
period 2 policy).
24To derive this expression, I let x be the number of votes against the government’s preferred
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Figure 1.3: Reappointment incentive if vote affects policy
As an illustration, consider Figure 1.3 representing the reappointment value
of voting for the government’s preferred policy, assuming the government is dove,
φ = 0.5 and b = 0; the latter is assumed to show that there are reappointment
incentives even if the central banker is not opportunistic. Larger values of b lead
to grater incentives to affect reappointment, more so for the single central banker
case, but do not change the general patterns I will describe below. As above, the
cases of (n, m
n




) and (9, 3
9
) are represented, respectively, by crosses,
a solid line, and boxes. I add a dotted line for the single central banker case. As a
result of m
n
falling, increases in n reduce the reappointment value of voting for the
government’s preferred rate, as can be seen by comparing the crosses and solid
line. Moreover, this value is much smaller under any configuration of a committee
than under a single central banker. It is important to highlight that the effect
of n is dominated by its impact on m
n
, rather than any other effect it may have,
as reflected by the fact that the (3, 1
3
), and (9, 3
9
) combinations yield virtually
identical values of voting for the inflation rate favored by the government.
In short, the effect of reappointment is in itself quite small in the committee
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case (both compared to the single central banker case, and with respect to the
range of values for the effect of reputation building seen, for instance, in Figure
1.2). Furthermore, sets of rules that limit the number of members over whose
appointment the government has power reduce the government’s power to affect
policy.
As suggested by previous literature, the ability of the government to dictate
monetary policy can be effectively limited by reducing the number of members
that can be appointed at any given point in time. However, in this model the
benefit of small values of m
n
comes from effects on a central banker’s incentives to
convince the government that his type and the government’s type are the same.
In previous papers (e.g. Waller 1989), each central banker votes for the policy
preferred by the government that appointed him, so that smaller turnover rates
reduce the influence of each government by reducing the fraction of CB members
who were appointed by each government and share that government’s type. I
consider these two channels to be complementary.
The benefit of collective decision making to minimize the effect of reap-
pointment considerations, however, is considerably reduced when representation
is brought into the picture. Since a central banker’s vote affects his chances
of reappointment with probability 1 but affects policy only with probability
∆Pr(π = πd), reappointment can be much more valuable in the committee case
than under a single central banker. Put simply: in terms of future expected
inflation a central banker within a committee cares only about the collective rep-
utation of the committee, while in terms of his reappointment it is his individual
reputation that matters. A single central banker is not affected by this distor-
tion in the relative importance of different incentives, and can ultimately be less
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susceptible to the government’s interests. Once again, the specific design of the
committee is critical in determining the potential benefits or costs of a committee
structure. In particular, the influence of the government over the choices of a cen-
tral banker is minimized if the risk of being removed from office for not favoring
the government is small (m
n
is small), but one’s vote has a large potential impact
on the choice of policy (n small so that representation is maximized).
Figure 1.4 illustrates the reappointment incentive after taking representation
into account (that is, the absolute value of the second term in the LHS of (1.16)).
As before, the figure assumes the government is dove, φ = 0.5 and b = 0. Crosses
represent (n, m
n
) = (3, 1
3
), a solid line is for (9, 1
9
) boxes are for (9, 3
9
), and the
dotted line is the single central banker case. For small values of w the reappoint-
ment incentive is always higher in the committee case, because representation is
very low (low w implies that most members are expected to vote for zero infla-
tion, so the vote of any individual member is expected to have low impact25).For
sufficiently high values of w, the committee can be more successful than the sin-
gle banker in isolating policy from government pressures, but only if n is small
enough to guarantee high representation, and m
n
is small enough to imply a low
risk of being removed from office by the government.
We can now consider simultaneously reappointment and reputation incentives.
A graphical representation of the LHS of condition (1.16) is offered in Figure 1.5
(a more explicit form of this condition is presented in appendix A), using the
same assumptions and conventions of figures 1.3 and 1.4. The top set of lines
represents the case of a hawk government, where the incentive to choose low
25In fact, the range of w represented in the Figure starts only at 0.4 because as w goes to
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Figure 1.5: Benefit of choosing vi = 0
inflation is maximized, and the bottom set is the case of a dove government.
Note first that, for any given combination (n, m
n
), there is a clear difference
between periods when the government is hawk and periods when it is dove, even
though b = 0 for this figure. This is key because it is frequently argued that
central bankers do not act opportunistically and this isolates their decisions from
incentives to impress the government. From this analysis, it is clear that even
purely “partisan” (or ideologically driven) central bankers want to keep their
jobs and are therefore not immune to government pressures. There is of course a
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difference with opportunistic central bankers in that partisan policy makers are
driven by the interest to be able to choose the policy they believe is best. In
terms of policy, however, the result is the same: they face an incentive to cater
to government preferences in order to stay in office.
Compared to a single central banker, a committee design has the potential
to both increase the importance of building a reputation for the CB being tough
on inflation, and reduce the importance of reappointment considerations26. The
realization of this potential, however, depends crucially on specific features of the
committee design, in particular its size and the number of members who remain
in office from one period to the next. An increase in the fraction of members to
be replaced, m
n
, reduces the relevance of past inflation for future expectations of
inflation, diminishing the ability of reputation considerations to contain inflation
bias. It also increases the risk that a central banker will be removed from office if
believed to be of a different type than the government, giving more importance
to incentives to follow the government’s preferred policy. On the other hand, an
increase in the size of the committee, n, reduces the ability any single central
banker has to affect actual policy, making central bankers more concerned about
influencing reappointment as opposed to choosing policy.
26In terms of the Figure, note that increasing reputation-building incentives and reducing
reappointment considerations act in opposite directions when the government is hawk. It is
therefore easier to see the potential gains from committee designs in the bottom portion, where
the dove government case is represented.
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1.6 Concluding remarks
Central Bank independence is a popular recipe to free monetary policy from both
inflation bias and the influence of the political cycle. In practice, however, politi-
cal, philosophical, and economic considerations have moved societies to maintain
institutional links between the government and the CB. This gives rise to the
question of whether the institutional design of the CB can be adapted to bring
out the desired benefits of independence, in an environment in which such inde-
pendence is, de facto, only partial.
In this quest, many countries have turned to committee designs of the mon-
etary authority, with the idea that these can be more easily shaped to generate
optimal outcomes. Two reasons are usually presented to argue that a committee
is more flexible than a monolithic institution: the decision making mechanism can
be designed to favor the optimal policy, and the terms of its members can be stag-
gered to make CB preferences more stable over time. These arguments, however,
overlook the fact that collective decision making also changes the fundamental
incentives faced by central bankers when choosing policy.
This paper studies how government appointments and a committee design af-
fect the structure of incentives faced by central bankers. I show that the flexibility
provided by a committee setting can be exploited both to reduce inflation bias
and to reduce the influence of the government on the choices of a central banker,
but the opposite can result if the size of the committee and the rate at which
its members rotate are not chosen appropriately. The basic assumption behind
these results is that the terms of central bankers’ can be extended by decision of
the government. That is, central bankers can be reappointed. In this context,
policy outcomes affect the reputation of the CB only if at least one central banker
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remains in office for the following period.
The persistence in policy that can result from staggering the terms of com-
mittee members can be beneficial not only because reducing the time variance
of policy has a direct positive effect on welfare, but also because it gives more
importance to the inter-temporal considerations that can ultimately deter central
bankers from inflating in excess. In this sense, an appropriately designed commit-
tee, in which a large fraction of members remains in office for at least one more
period, can reduce the inflation bias of monetary policy. By favoring incentives
to choose conservative monetary policy, rather than the policy preferred by the
government, an appropriate committee design may also reduce the link between
monetary policy and the political cycle.
I also explore the idea that collective decision making creates a dichotomy
between the collective and individual reputations of board members, in a context
where the former depends on past policy outcomes, while the latter depend on
the individual decisions of those members. Since the individual vote of a member
may not be reflected in the policy outcome, the desire to protect CB reputa-
tion may be dominated by individual reputation considerations. This implies
that a central banker may give more importance to maximizing his chances of
reappointment than to choosing the optimal monetary policy, if the government
makes reappointment decisions based on a central banker’s individual reputation.
As a result, a committee design may actually end up increasing the influence of
the government on monetary policy, if each central banker feels that he has little
power to affect the policy outcome. This implies that only a committee of small
size, where each member’s actions are more likely to be effective, will have the






Political Budget Cycles When Politicians Have Favorites
This chapter is joint work with Allan Drazen
2.1 Introduction and literature review
In recent years, a growing body of literature has been devoted to the idea that, as
an election approaches, elected officials tailor fiscal policy to improve the chances
that they or their parties will be reelected. Although common wisdom has long
given credit to this idea, economic theory has struggled with the question of why
would politicians expect electoral benefits from adopting popular policies before
the elections. The answer is not obvious, since rational individuals should vote
on the basis of the policies they expect for after the election, rather than on past
outcomes. The line of thought introduced by K. Rogoff and A. Sibert (1988)
argues that fiscal choices reflect unobservable and persistent characteristics of
officials and, as a result, also exhibit some inertia. Voters therefore try to infer
from the incumbent’s past policy choices the policies he would adopt if re-elected.
This explains why those past choices affect the voters’ decision on whether to
support the incumbent in the election.
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The idea that the votes of forward-looking individuals are only affected by
past policy if it is correlated with the future choices of candidates is hardly con-
troversial. An open question, however, is what are the persistent characteristics
of officials that voters value and try to infer from past fiscal policies. Existing
models focus on the competence of officials to provide public goods, defined as
the ability to produce more goods with a given size of the budget. Voters prefer
more competent officials, but have only imperfect information about the candi-
dates’ levels of competence. The two leading models are those by Rogoff (1990)
and Shi and Svenson (2002).
In Rogoff’s (1990) signaling model, voters prefer incumbents who provide
more public goods, but only part of the goods actually provided are observed
by those voters. A highly competent incumbent has an incentive to increase
the provision of those visible goods before an election (possibly also contracting
spending in their “invisible” counterparts), in order to signal his competence to
voters. Shi and Svensson (2002), meanwhile, assume that the incumbent himself
has imperfect information about his competence at the time of choosing the size
of the budget (equal to taxes plus the deficit). He realizes his competence and
provides public goods after choosing the total budget1, but before the election.
The authors also adopt a variant of Rogoff’s assumptions about information
available to voters: a part of the electorate does not observe the deficit, but
only the provision of public goods, and tax revenues. As a result, the incumbent
has incentives to choose larger deficits before the election, to be able to provide
1Note that the “provision of public goods” and the level of spending, or “the budget” differ
precisely due to the official’s competence. A more competent official provides more goods with
the same level of spending. Predictions about the level of public goods provided may therefore
not translate into predictions about the level of spending.
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more goods for any given level of competence he realizes.
The competence argument provides a plausible and enlightening explanation
for pre-electoral manipulation of the budget. Theory should, however, make
room for other widely held views about electoral practices. Some of these may
explain why electoral manipulation of the budget is seen as pervasive even in
countries where information about fiscal policy is widely available. The assump-
tion that competence is unobservable, which is equivalent to some components
of the budget being unobservable, may not be realistic for these countries. Al-
ternative views may also explain why pre-electoral increases in deficits and total
government spending, which at least under some scenarios arise in models of
competence-based PBC, are not widely observed (as some empirical evidence
reviewed below shows).
One of those alternative views is that an official provides more public goods
to specific groups he either favors or finds attractive from an electoral point
of view, and that those targeted expenditures increase when elections are on
sight. Theoretical work on this idea has been limited, and has not addressed two
key questions: why would pre-electoral targeting affect the votes of individuals
choosing who will govern in the future, and why would targeting be concentrated
before the election. Dixit and Londregan (1996) present perhaps the leading
formal model of spending targeted to specific groups. In their model, politicians
target “swing voters”, who are more willing than others to change their votes in
light of the politicians’ promises of post-election spending. A politician also tends
to target groups of voters to whom he can transfer resources more easily. In the
model, however, the choices of candidates take the form of campaign promises,
and voters decide their votes based on those promises. There is no link to actual
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policy choices and their timing (including electoral cycles), or explicit reasons for
why voters should trust promises.
This paper offers a model of political budget cycles with rational agents,
in which targeted spending plays a key role. We focus on the idea that each
voter has a taste for a limited set of public goods, rather than favoring high
spending in general. For instance, elderly voters probably value only marginally
the construction of playgrounds, and voters in Alaska have no interest in the
construction of roads in Hawaii. The model also distinguishes targeted from non-
targeted expenditures, where the crucial distinction lies in the electoral benefits
to the incumbent from increases in each category. In particular, non-targeted
expenses are those valued only marginally by voters from any important group.
There are no deficits, and therefore policy choices relate to the composition, rather
than the size, of the government’s budget.. Politicians favor specific groups in
society, and those preferences evolve only slowly over time. What a specific
voter wants to find out is which of the candidates has preferences closest to his
own at the time of the election. In other words, along the dimension of public
goods provision, a voter wants to support the candidate that will target him with
expenditures after the election.
In this framework, we show that before elections incumbents can be expected
to increase targeted spending, while they contract other types of expenditure,
avoiding increases in the deficit. This follows from efforts to convince specific
groups of voters that they are favored by the incumbent, so that they would
benefit from having him re-elected. This result is consistent with much of the
empirical evidence, which shows that pre-electoral expansions in some categories
of spending, particularly those covering the development of infrastructure, are ac-
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companied by contractions in other categories. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001)
document this for Canadian provinces, where some capital expenses grow before
elections, while spending in social services, industrial development, and health
actually show pre-electoral contractions, leaving overall spending unchanged. For
Mexico, M. González (2001) shows election-year increases of government invest-
ment and contractions of current transfers. A similar finding will be shown for
the Colombian case in the following chapter.
Our emphasis on pre-electoral changes in the composition of spending, as
opposed to increases in the overall budget and/or the deficit, is motivated by the
empirical literature on fiscal preferences of voters. This literature indicates that
voters actually punish incumbents who run high-spending policies. For instance,
Brender (2003) finds that the chances of re-election of incumbent local officials in
Israel are a decreasing function of the government deficit in the year leading to
the election. Peltzman (1992) shows that, in the US, the share of votes received
by the incumbent’s party is also decreasing in recent government expenditures.
Similarly, for OECD countries, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) find that
governments that adopt tight fiscal policies do not suffer falls in popularity. In
short, voters seem to penalize rather than reward high levels of spending, and
this should be reflected in the theory of political budget cycles.
A key point of the model is that electoral manipulation arises even with fully
rational voters, given that voters must try to infer the incumbent’s preferences
from his past fiscal behavior. Higher pre-election spending in a given good signals
high appreciation of that good by the politician (i.e. appreciation for the group
that values that good), and is therefore positively correlated with its provision
after the election. Voters are therefore rationally led to respond to pre-electoral
56
increases in their most preferred types of spending. Although they are aware of
the incumbent’s attempts to influence the election, they cannot determine if their
group is being targeted because it is seen as key to the incumbent’s re-election,
or because the incumbent genuinely favors it.
The strength of the political cycle in our model depends on the distribution
of ideological preferences, and on the amount of information voters have about
the political environment . As is probably not surprising, targeted spending in-
creases more prior to elections if there is a larger fraction of swing voters. In a
multi-group framework, more undecided groups of voters receive more electoral
transfers than their committed counterparts. However, in our model voters an-
ticipate this behavior. As a result, high levels of spending targeted to undecided
voters are recognized as being politically motivated, rather than being interpreted
as a genuine signal that the politician favors the goods preferred by those voters.
This creates a natural limit to electorally motivated increases in spending. On
the other hand, the incumbent’s ability to engage in this form of electoral ma-
nipulation is increased by its access to privileged information about the political
environment. In particular, politicians in our model have more information than
voters about the potential electoral benefits of targeting expenditures to a spe-
cific group of voters (i.e. how “swing” or undecided the group is). This increases
their ability to obtain political support from increases in targeted expenses, as
voters cannot determine if this targeting is politically motivated.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a basic model with homo-
geneous voters and only two types of incumbents, in which the incumbent chooses
how to split the budget between targeted and non-targeted spending. We use this
model to introduce the basic inference problem faced by voters, and to derive the
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pre-electoral shift from non-targeted towards targeted types of spending. The
model also makes clear that PBCs based on targeted spending can arise even if
voters can perfectly observe all components of the budget, which is not the case
in models where PBC’s arise from competence signaling. In section 2.3 we in-
corporate the division of voters in different interest groups, and consider infinite
types of incumbents. We show how pre-electoral transfers are allocated across
groups of voters. Finally, section 2.4 presents some concluding remarks.
2.2 A three-period model
We begin with a basic model of elections between an incumbent official and a
challenger. The incumbent has the ability to choose fiscal policy, and a central
assumption is that individuals value targeted transfers or expenditures, but dislike
deficits. They vote on the basis of these indicators, which politicians take into
account in designing policy meant to increase their electoral prospects. We focus
on the targeting of expenditures, and simply assume that the aversion of voters
to deficits imposes a tight fiscal constraint: incumbents can neither raise taxes,
nor incur deficits. In short, the sum of all expenditures must always equal the
fixed level of taxes. Of course, a voter could be targeted with both low taxes and
high expenditures to gain his votes but, to simplify this exposition, it is assumed
that only expenditures are used to target individual voters before elections.
There are three periods, t − 1, t, t + 1, with an election at the end of t. The
choice of fiscal policy concerns the composition of the budget between targeted
and non-targeted expenses. The incumbent politician chooses fiscal policy ac-
cording to his preferences over the composition of the budget, but also to attract
voters. For simplicity, we assume that each voter has a taste for only one type of
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government expenditure, and voters are grouped according to their preferences
over types of expenditure. Thus, a group h is made up of people who prefer the
same type of expenditure gh, and everyone in group h receives the same per-capita
level of the expenditure. Voters within a group will differ in their preferences over
policies other than targeted expenditures (termed “ideology”). Although there
can in principle be many groups of voters, in this section we assume targeted
expenses are homogeneous, and therefore all voters are lumped into the same
group. We therefore focus on the tension between targeted and non-targeted ex-
penses, rather than the allocation of goods across groups of voters. We address
the second issue in section 2.3.
2.2.1 Voters
An individual trades off ideology over non-fiscal policy π, and utility from targeted
expenditures, gt, in deciding whether to support a candidate. The idea of targeted
expenses is close to that in Dixit and Londregan’s model of targeted transfers
(1996), but in a setting where expectations of future policy play a key role as
determinants of how an individual votes.
Utility of an individual depends on two factors, each of which may be influ-
enced by government policy. First, there is the consumption of the government
supplied good gt ≥ 0, which provides utility directly. We abstract here from
other types of consumption, which are affected by tax policy, since we are impos-
ing fixed taxes. Second, an individual j also cares about the distance between
his most desired position over non-fiscal policies πj (which is immutable) and the
position πI of the politician in power (where I refers to the incumbent). We take
both πI and πC, the challenger’s position, as given. In the post-election period,
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t+ 1, either the initial incumbent I or a challenger C may be in power.
Single period utility of individual j in period t if politician P is in power may
be written





where V 0 (·) > 0, V 00 (·) < 0, and gt also depends on P , given that it is chosen
by the government. A voter j is thus characterized by πj. (To help in following
the exposition, note that V (gt) does not depend on j, since all voters receive the
same level of targeted expenses. Hence in discussing the problem of inferring gt+1
from gt, we may ignore the index j.)
An individual’s only choice is whether to vote for the incumbent or the chal-
lenger, and only in an election period. We therefore focus on utility as of period
t, when the election takes place. The present expected discounted utility of indi-
vidual j as of period t is
W jt = U
j
t (I) + βEtU
j
t+1(P ) (2.2)
where β is the discount factor, and P = I, C. EtU
j
t+1(P ) is the utility expected
for period t + 1 from the perspective of t. Uncertainty about t + 1 stems from
two sources: uncertainty about who will be in office after the elections, and
uncertainty about the preferences of the candidates. The latter will be made
clear in the next section.
2.2.2 Politicians
We assume fixed tax revenue and zero budget deficit, so that government fiscal
policy consists only of expenditure decisions. There are two government provided
goods: gt to voters and Kt, a good which the politician values but which voters
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do not. One may think, for example, of politicians who value managing a large
bureaucracy. (For simplicity of exposition we call Kt “desks”.) However, the idea
we have in mind is more general: voters may value some government services
less than others for many reasons, such as the low visibility of some types of
expenditure or voters’ failure to recognize the positive externalities these services
produce. The characterization of Kt as total waste in the eyes of voters is sim-
ply an extreme way to capture those differences in the value assigned by voters
to different goods and services provided by the government. Each period, the
government thus faces a budget constraint:
T = Kt + gt (2.3)
where T is a fixed an exogenous level of tax revenue.
The politician’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of transformed vot-
ers’ utilities, the fixed value χ of being in office, and the value of non-targeted
expenses. We let ωP,t denote the weight a politician P puts on voters, as op-
posed to non-targeted expenses, in period t. A politician P 0s objective in the











+ a(Kt+1) + χ (2.4)
where N is the size of the voting population, which we assume to be constant,
K is non-targeted expenditure and a(K) is an increasing and (weakly) concave
function. We have written this objective in per-capita terms for simplicity.
The crucial assumption in our argument about the effectiveness of election
year expenditures to produce votes is that ωPt is not observed by the voters,
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but is correlated over time. Voters can only try to infer the value of ωI,t+1 from
observations on gt, that is, on expenditures before an election. Hence, in this
model the reason why voters prefer some types of politicians over others has to
do with the politicians’ preferences, rather than their ability to provide public
goods. Information asymmetries do not refer to a lack of ability, on the part of
voters, to observe parts of the budget, but to the politician’s preferences being
his private information.
We make assumptions such that ωI,t provides all relevant information about
ωI,t+1, which is the reason why voters focus solely on gt rather than incorporating
policies further into the past (i.e. gt−1). More generally, the idea is that is ωI,t+1 is
closest to ωI,t, so that voters would take into account all past policy realizations,
but give more importance to more recent observations. We abstract from this
possibility for simplicity, and therefore will make no further reference to period
t− 1, which is introduced only to show why manipulation occurs right before the
election, rather than over the whole horizon of the incumbent in power.
We assume the process governing the evolution of ωPt for P ∈ {I, C} takes
the simplest possible form that satisfies the conditions discussed above. In par-
ticular, for any politician P , ωPt can take on two values: ωPt = {ω,ω} with prior
probabilities Pr(ω = ω) = p̄ and Pr(ω = ω) = (1 − p̄). We suppose ω > ω, so
that a politician endowed with ω cares more about targeting expenses to people
(a people politician), while ωPt = ω makes the politician more interested in bu-
reaucracy than targeting (a desks politician). Moreover, also for simplicity, ωPt
only changes from t− 1 to t, but not from t to t+1. That is, ωPt = ωP,t+1 ≡ ωP
for P ∈ {I, C}.
Abstracting from constant terms, we write the incumbent’s objective in an
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election year as
ΩIt = ωIVt (gt) + a(Kt) + βρ(gt)Ω
I
t+1 + β (1− ρ(gt))Ω
I(P=C)
t+1 (2.5)
where β is a discount factor and ρ is the probability of re-election, which is a
function of gt given that voters use gt to make inferences about the incumbent’s
preferences. ΩI(P=C)t+1 represents the utility the incumbent would obtain if the
challenger won the election, given by his post-election objective function evalu-
ated (in expected terms) at πP = πC, χ = 0, and the levels of gt+1 and Kt+1
that the challenger provides. Note that in (2.5) we dropped the term concerning
ideology because, since ideological positions of both voters and candidates are
given, this argument is a constant in period t.
One solves the problem backwards, starting with the post-election period. A
government P maximizes (2.4) by choice of gt+1 subject to the budget constraint





(T − gt+1) (2.6)
The assumption of concavity of V (g) and a(K) implies that the post-election
transfers to people are increasing in the weight the politician gives to such trans-
fers, so that gt+1(ω) > gt+1(ω). We will denote gt+1(ω) = g, and suppose that
ω, the value of ω for the people-type politician, tends to ∞, so that he always
chooses the maximum level of transfers possible, gt+1(ω) = T . This assumption
simplifies the solution but, as we discuss later, we could dispense of it and still
prove that politicians are expected to engage in pre-electoral increases in targeted
expenses.
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In the election period, the incumbent chooses gt to maximize his objective
(2.5), subject to the budget constraint (2.3). The fact that gt affects his chances
of reelection, implies that a politician may then choose a value of gt different from
what he chooses in a non-election period. Given our assumption that ω −→∞, a
“people-type” politician would provide the maximum possible gt even in the non-
election period, so he would not change his policy in the election period. A desks
policy-maker (one characterized by ω), however, could choose gt(ω) > g if that
would get him more votes. In particular, from the solution to the post-election
fiscal problem and voters’ preferences, notice that voters prefer a people policy-
maker over a desks one, so the latter may find worth pretending he is of the people
type. There are, therefore, two possible choices of policy for an incumbent with
ω = ω: his own preferred non-election spending (that is, gt(ω) = gt+1(ω) = g),
or gt(ω) = T , the transfer provided by the high type in any period2. He will
choose high transfers if the current utility benefit from choosing his preferred
policy (low gt) is smaller than the benefit derived from increasing his reelection
chances through high targeted expenses. More formally, the desk-type incumbent
will choose high targeted spending in the election period if
∆Ω < β
¡




(∆Ωp̄ + χ) (2.7)








a(T − g)− a(0)
¤
> 0
2In fact, we chose ω −→∞ precisely to constrain the choice space to this binomial configu-
ration. Notice that by choosing any policy different from gt = T the politician reveals himself
as the low type, which is the reason why no other policy generates electoral benefits.
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(where the last inequality follows from g being policy that maximizes ω (V (g))+
a(T − g)).
Note that the benefit from choosing high transfers in t, given by the right
hand side of condition (2.7), depends on both the gain in reelection probability,¡




, and the value of being reelected. The latter includes not only
the exogenous value given to office, χ, but also the value of having in t+ 1 one’s
preferred policy rather than the challenger’s, which is non-zero only in the event
the challenger is of a different type. This explains the presence of p̄ = Pr(ωP = ω)
in condition (2.7).
The following proposition summarizes the behavior of the incumbent:
Proposition 2 In the election period, the incumbent’s optimal choice of targeted
expenses gt(ωI) is characterized by the following policy rule:
gt(ωI = ω) = T
and
gt(ωI = ω) =
½
T if ∆Ω < β
¡







To find the equilibrium choice of policy, we still need to characterize the




, which depend on voters’ choices. We
therefore turn now to characterizing those choices.
2.2.3 Voting behavior and election outcomes
We consider now the problem of voters. Let E [V (gt+1) | P, gt] be voters’ expec-
tation of his utility from government transfers if politician P is elected for t+ 1,
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conditional on gt. An individual j votes for the incumbent if he expects to receive
higher utility in t+ 1 under the incumbent, relative to the challenger. This is,
E [V (gt+1) | I, gt]− (πj − πI)2 > E [V (gt+1) | C]− (πj − πC)2 (2.8)
The voter knows the ideological positions of both challenger and incumbent,
πI and πC, as well as the politicians’ first order condition for the post-election
period, (2.6), which determines gt+1. However, he has imperfect information
about both ωI and ωC. To infer the challenger’s position, he has no other in-
formation than the knowledge of the ex-ante distribution of ω, summarized by
Pr(ωC = ω) = p̄. However, voters can use the realization of gt to extract addi-
tional information about the incumbent’s type. Using Bayes’ rule and the prior p̄,
voters adjust their beliefs about the incumbent according to following expression:
p̄1(gt) ≡ Pr(ω = ω | gt) =
Pr(gt | ω = ω) ∗ Pr(ω = ω)
Pr(gt)
(2.9)
where we have denoted the posterior probability voters assign to ω = ω̄ as p̄1(gt).
Equation (2.9) captures the rational essence of voters in this model. Specifi-
cally, it implies:
p̄1(gt = g) = 0
That is, since voters know a people type politician never chooses low transfers
(Pr(gt = g | ω = ω) = 0), upon observing gt = g they assign a zero probability
to the incumbent having ωI = ω. On the other hand,
p̄1(gt = T ) =
p̄
p̄+ (1− p̄)q (2.10)
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where q = Pr(gt = T | ω = ω) ≤ 1 is the probability that a low-type politician
will choose gt = T in the electoral period.
The nature of voters’ posterior beliefs reflects an essential characteristic of this
political game: while high pre-election transfers indicate the incumbent would
also choose high targeting after the election, voters only take this signal seriously
if the political incentive is not so large that in the election period any politician
would provide high electoral transfers, no matter what his preferences are. This
explains why observing high pre-election transfers does not give the incumbent
any advantage over the challenger if q = 1 (i.e. p̄1(gt = T ) = p̄ if q = 1).
We can now rewrite the condition under which voter j prefers the incumbent
over the challenger, condition (2.8), as:
(p̄1(gt)− p̄)
£
V (T )− V (g)
¤
> (πj − πI)2 − (πj − πC)2 (2.11)
where the left hand side represents the expected gain in utility from consump-
tion if the incumbent is reelected, and the right hand side represents the expected
loss in utility from ideological issues if reelection occurs.
Since the vote of any individual depends on his position in the ideological
space, we need to give more structure to the distribution of voter preferences
to determine the share of votes an incumbent obtains (and hence his re-election
probability ρ) for a given choice of election period fiscal policy.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that smaller πj represent positions more
“to the left”, and πI < πC. Assume also that there are three ideological positions
voters hold: eπj = {π̂I , πM = πI+πC
2
, π̂C}. Voters with π = π̂I are the incumbent’s
core voters, and they are so far left of center that they vote for the incumbent
even if he is known to be of the desks type, that is, even if p̄1 = 0. Analogously,
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voters with π = π̂C are the challenger’s core voters, and they are so far right of
center that they vote for the challenger even if the incumbent is known to be of the
people type3. In the middle are voters with π = πM , swing voters in that they are
ideologically as close to one candidate as they are to the other. They therefore
vote on the basis of the fiscal policy they expect to see from the candidates.
They vote for the incumbent if and only if they believe he is more likely than
the challenger to have high ω, that is, iff p̄1(gI1) > p̄. (If p̄1(g
I
1) = p̄, swing voters
are indifferent between the two candidates, and vote to reelect the incumbent
with some probability r. We postpone further analysis of this case for section
2.2.4, where we study the equilibrium.) The crucial point is that swing voters
may be led to vote for the incumbent by high pre-election targeted expenditure,
even though they know that he may be a desks politician who provides such
expenditure solely to increase his chances of being reelected.
We summarize the behavior of voters in
Proposition 3 In an election between the incumbent and a challenger, the op-
timal voting strategy of an individual j is given by:
1) If πj = π̂I individual j votes for the incumbent with probability 1
2) If πj = π̂C individual j votes for the challenger with probability 1
3) If πj = π
C+πI
2
individual j votes for the incumbent with probability r(gt),
3Formally, using (2.11), one may derive π̂I < πM − p̄[V (T )−V (g)]2(πC−πI) and π̂
C > πM +




r(gt) = 1 if p̄1(gt) > p̄
r(gt) ∈ [0, 1] if p̄1(gt) = p̄
r(gt) = 0 if p̄1(gt) < p̄
where p̄1(g) = 0, and p̄1(T ) =
p̄
p̄+(1−p̄)q
Given the voting strategies in proposition 3, election outcomes are easy to
characterize. Let φI, φC and φM , be the fraction of voters with π
j equal to π̂I ,







is decided following a simple majority rule4. Hence, no candidate can win the
election without getting the votes of at least some swing voters5, and a candidate
supported by all swing voters wins the election. The incumbent obtains φI of the
votes if p̄1 < p̄, φI + rφM if p̄1 = p̄, and φI + φM of the votes otherwise. In other
words, the incumbent is re-elected if p̄1 > p̄ or if p̄1 = p̄ and φI + rφM ≥ 0.5.
For the time being, we assume that both voters and politicians have perfect
information about φI , φM , and φC.
Translating this into election outcomes as a function of gt, the assumption
that no group of core voters is a majority implies that an incumbent who chooses
4For completeness, we will suppose that a tie is resolved in favor of the incumbent, but this
is not crucial to our results.
5This follows from our assumption that φI <
1
2 and φC <
1
2 . The solution is trivial if any
group of core voters is a majority: the election is decided beforehand, and therefore there is
no incentive for the incumbent to increase transfers in the pre-electoral period. Fiscal policy is
given by gt(ω) = gt+1(ω), and swing voters vote for the incumbent if and only if they observe
high pre-election transfers, but their vote does not affect the outcome of the election.
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low pre-electoral targeted spending will not be reelected, since voters recognize
him as being of the desks type. Hence, ρ(gt = g) = 0. Moreover, ρ (T ) = 1 if
swing voters prefer the incumbent (p̄1(gt) > p̄), since φI + φM = 1 − φC ≥ 12 .
Finally, if swing voters are indifferent between the two candidates (p̄1(gt) = p̄)
then ρ (T ) = 1 if and only if indifferent voters choose the incumbent with high
enough probability, and there are enough swing voters. That is, if and only if
φI + r(gt)φM ≥ 0.5.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
Armed with this knowledge of optimal strategies, we can now study the possible
political-economic equilibria. We use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
A pair of strategies (for the incumbent and voters) is an equilibrium if the voter’s
strategy satisfies proposition 3 and the incumbent’s choice of gt satisfies propo-
sition 2 given the voters’ behavior. Note that these conditions are sufficient and
necessary for an equilibrium since: 1) posterior beliefs in proposition 3, repre-
sented by p̄1(gt), obey Bayes’ rule, 2) proposition 3 summarizes the strategy that
maximizes a voter’s utility given his beliefs and the incumbent’s strategy, gt(ωI),
and 3) proposition 2 summarizes the strategy that maximizes the incumbent’s
utility.
For simplicity of notation we describe the incumbent’s strategy in terms of the
probability of choosing gt = T given his type, Pr(gt = T | ωI), and swing voter
j’s strategy in terms of r(gt), the probability that he will vote for the incumbent
given gt. We have already discussed the voting strategies of core voters.
Given the strategies in propositions 2 and 3, there are three possible types of
equilibria:
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Pooling equilibria: incumbents choose Pr (gt = T | ωI) = 1 independently of








A separating equilibrium: each type of politician chooses the same policy they
will choose in the post election period, and swing voters vote for the incumbent
if and only if gt = T .
Equilibria in mixed strategies: a desks incumbent chooses Pr (gt = T | ωI) =
q ∈ (0, 1) and swing voters vote for the incumbent if and only if gt = T.
These three sets of strategies indeed constitute equilibria, since no player
wants to deviate from his strategy, given the other’s. Note also that there are no
pooling equilibria with r(gt = T ) <
0.5−φI
φM
, since then incumbent would be better
off deviating to Pr (gt = T | ωI = ω) = 0.
Proposition 4 describes the equilibrium outcomes for the case where swing
voters shift the outcome of the election, depending on whether a desks politician
gives more value to reelection or to providing low transfers (that is, whether
β(p̄∆Ω+ χ) > ∆Ω).
Proposition 4 Given φI + φM ≥ 0.5, there are three cases in equilibrium:
Case 1) β(p̄∆Ω+ χ) > ∆Ω
The optimal strategy for the incumbent is
Pr (gt = T | ω) = Pr (gt = T | ω) = 1





if gt = T
0 otherwise
¾
Case 2) β(p̄∆Ω+ χ) = ∆Ω
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The optimal strategy for the incumbent is
Pr (gt = T | ωI) =
½
1 if ω = ω
q ∈ [0, 1) if ω = ω
¾
The optimal strategy for swing voters is
r (gt) =
½
1 if gt = T
0 otherwise
¾
Case 3) β(p̄∆Ω+ χ) < ∆Ω
The optimal strategy for the incumbent is
Pr (gt = T | ωI) =
½
1 if ω = ω
0 if ω = ω
¾
The optimal strategy for swing voters is
r (gt) =
½
1 if gt = T
0 otherwise
¾
Proof. Note first that all of these sets of strategies constitute equilibria, since
given the voters’ strategy the incumbent’s satisfies proposition 2, and given the
incumbent’s strategy the voters’ satisfies proposition 3. Second, to prove that in
each case only the type of equilibrium described exists, note that a separating
(resp. pooling) equilibrium cannot be supported if β(p∆Ω + χ) > ∆Ω (resp.
< ∆Ω) because the incumbent would deviate to gt(ω) = T (resp.gt(ω) = g).
Moreover, an equilibrium where the incumbent plays mixed strategies can only
exist if he is indifferent between the two policies, which happens iff β(p∆Ω+χ) =
∆Ω.
Proposition 4 implies that, provided reelection is valuable enough to incum-
bents, desk type politicians will choose gt = T with some positive probability.
Meanwhile, in the post election period desk politicians choose gt = g with cer-
tainty. As a result, the unconditional expectation of government’s targeted ex-
penses is higher in the pre-election period, compared to their expected value for
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other periods6. Conversely, non-targeted expenses are expected to be lower prior
to an election than in other periods. In other words, fiscal policy exhibits cy-
cles with the timing of elections. These cycles take the form of a change in the
composition of expenditures, which shift towards targeted expenses in election
times.
Of course, a political budget cycle of this formwill only appear if the incentives
to influence the election are large enough. There are two parts to this requirement.
The first refers to the preferences of politicians: electoral manipulation of the
budget will only arise if β(p∆Ω+χ) ≥ ∆Ω, so that the incumbent assigns a large
value to being reelected. There is, however, an additional necessary condition,
namely that swing voters (those whose voters depend on fiscal policy) can change
the outcome of the election (φI + φM ≥ 0.5). The existence of a political budget
cycle therefore depends on the political environment, in particular in the potential
electoral benefit from increasing transfers.
What is interesting about the apparently obvious need for a large fraction of
impressionable voters is that, given the rational character of voters in our model,
fiscal manipulation is less effective to “buy” the vote of any single individual
precisely in the cases where there are most swing voters. In this simplified setting,
where our assumptions imply ρ(gt) is either 0 or 1, this is reflected in the fact
that p̄1(T | φI + φM < 0.5) = 1 ≥ p̄1(T | φI + φM ≥ 0.5).
Note further that the assumption that ω = ∞ (and the implication that a
fiscal expansion in an election year reflects mimicking by the ω politician, whom
6The unconditional expectation of targeted expenditure is given by E(gt) =
T [p̄+ (1− p̄)Pr(gt = T | ω)]+ g(1− p̄)Pr(gt = g | ω) in the preelection period, and E(gt+1) =
E(gt−1) = T p̄+ g(1− p̄) in non-election times.
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voters would not prefer if his type were known) is a convenient modeling device,
rather than essential to the existence of the political cycle. If ω < ∞, a cycle
might take the form of signaling, in that the ω type would choose g in both elec-
tion and non-election periods, while the ω type would choose gt just high enough
to separate himself in an election period. Under the now familiar conditions that
re-election is valuable enough, this gt is higher than this type’s gt+1, and we have
(qualitatively, at least) the same type of cycle. For instance, in Rogoff’s (1990)
model, pre-electoral manipulation arises from signaling by the good type (compe-
tence signaling, since competence is the focus of his model rather than targeted
spending). His approach has been criticized (unfairly, we think) in that it is the
more competent candidate who engages in fiscal manipulation, rather than the
less competent one. In a mimicking model it is the less desirable candidate who
engages in fiscal manipulation. What is essential to our model (and to Rogoff’s
as well, from our perspective) is that at least some types of officials engage in
this manipulation. Which types are susceptible to these incentives changes with
the specific assumptions of the model, and is therefore not substantive or robust.
In fact, in section 2.3 we extend the model to continuous types, and show that
under certain conditions all types may engage in election-year manipulations of
the budget.
2.2.5 Asymmetric information about the electoral envi-
ronment
So far we have assumed that all players have symmetric and perfect information
about φI , φM , and φC. This assumption is clearly not realistic, as the electoral
effectiveness of providing targeted spending to voters is not known with certainty,
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and candidates frequently hold more information about it than the public does.
We will now relax this assumption, and show that the existence of asymmetric
information about the political environment reinforces the incentives faced by in-
cumbent officials to affect election outcomes through changes in fiscal policy. This
will also eliminate the unsatisfactory feature that in some of the equilibria with
electoral transfers (in particular the pooling equilibrium) voters are indifferent
between the challenger and an incumbent that targets them with spending. This
is of course a result of the technical approach and the simplifying assumptions
we have made, so we do not take the model as predicting that voters will strictly
be indifferent. However, it does open the question of how do individuals actually
vote when they are “indifferent”, since one would not expect them to simply toss
a coin to define which way to vote. In other words, one may question whether
r(g)²(0, 1) is meaningful in terms of the actual behavior of voters.
To account for the possibility that candidates running for election know more
than voters about how effective are targeted expenses to generate votes, we as-
sume that the shares of core and swing voters are only known to the politician.
In particular, we assume that voters assign a probability z that φI+φM ≥ 0.5. In
other words, voters assign a probability 1−z that the challenger’s core voters are
a majority, in which case a desks incumbent would have no incentive to choose
gt = T .
Voters now characterize the behavior of the incumbent by
Pr(gt = T ) = p̄+ z(1− p̄) Pr(gt = T | ω = ω,φI + φM ≥ 0.5)
where, as before, p̄ is the unconditional probability that the incumbent is not a
desks politician.
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After observing fiscal policy, voters update their beliefs about the incumbent’s
type following Bayes’ rule, as captured by equation (2.9). Their beliefs on the
probability that a policy maker who chose high transfers is of the high type are
now:
p̄1(gt = T ) ≡ Pr(ω = ω | gt = T ) (2.12)
=
p̄
p̄+ z(1− p̄) Pr(gt = T | ω = ω,φI + φM ≥ 0.5)
Given z < 1 , it is now the case that p̄1(gt = T ) > p̄ even if Pr(gt = T | ω =
ω,φI + φM ≥ 0.5) = 1. That is, it is now true the incumbent can lead swing
voters to prefer him over the challenger by choosing high transfers, even if desks
politicians are as likely to choose high election transfers as high-type politicians
whenever φI + φM ≥ 0.5. The reason is simply that voters do not know whether
the latter holds.
The equilibria for this case are described in proposition 5
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, the optimal strategy for swing voters is
r (gt) =
½
1 if gt = T
0 otherwise
¾
The optimal strategy for the incumbent is
Pr (gt = T | ωI) =
½
1 if ω = ω
q if ω = ω
¾
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where q = 0 if φI + φM < 0.5. If φI + φM ≥ 0.5 then
q = 1 if β(p∆Ω+ χ) > ∆Ω
q = 0 if β(p∆Ω+ χ) < ∆Ω
q ∈ [0, 1) if β(p∆Ω+ χ) = ∆Ω
This type of imperfect information makes the problem more interesting, by
capturing an additional inference problem for voters. Voters now need to make
inferences about whether they are being targeted with transfers because the politi-
cian likes providing such transfers, or because transfers are very effective to raise
votes. The fact that they assign some probability that the latter is not true gives
more room for the politician to influence the outcome of elections by providing
more targeted expenses prior to elections.
2.3 A generalization: letting politicians have fa-
vorites
The simple model discussed above illustrates the ideas of voters rationally re-
sponding to pre-electoral manipulation and of the electoral shift of government
resources toward targeted spending. This simplified setting, however, also raises
questions that need to be addressed in a more general model. First, an unattrac-
tive feature of that simple model is that the categorization of politicians into
two types renders an equilibrium in which only one of the types engages in pre-
electoral manipulation. Second, if electoral manipulation arises from targeting
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spending toward projects most favored by voters, it would be more natural to
represent voters as having heterogeneous fiscal preferences. In fact, our focus on
targeted spending comes from the belief that voters have narrowly defined prefer-
ences over government expenditure, and that they want fiscal policy in the hands
of an official who shares those preferences with them. It is our view that voters
use pre-election fiscal policy not only to learn about the incumbent’s preferences
in terms of targeted and non-targeted spending, but also to identify which candi-
date should be expected to devote larger resources to the projects a given group
of individuals is most interested in. Put in a different way, an individual’s vote
also depends on his beliefs about which groups of voters are most favored by the
incumbent. A relevant question is, therefore, how does the incumbent allocate
targeted spending across different groups of voters. We present in this section
a more general version of the model discussed above, in which we address the
allocation of spending across groups of voters and consider a continuum of types
of politicians.
We assume that each voter has a taste for only one type of government ex-
penditure. Groups of voters are defined according to preferences over types of
expenditure: a group h is made up of people who prefer the same type of ex-
penditure gh, and everyone in group h receives the same per-capita level of the
expenditure. For simplicity, we consider only two different types of targeted
spending. This defines two groups of voters, h1 and h2.
Within each group, voters differ in their preferences toward non-fiscal policies.
That is, for each group there is a non-degenerate distribution of preferences over
ideology; we denote this distribution as fh(π) for group h. As we did at the end
of section 2.2, we assume there is asymmetric information about the effectiveness
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of different types of government expenditure in raising votes (i.e. how “swing”
specific groups of voters are). In particular, we assume that the incumbent knows
fh1(π) and fh2(π), while voters only have imperfect information about them. We
will first focus on the most general form of the problem, and will only later
make specific assumptions about the amount of information about the f 0s that
is available to voters.
2.3.1 Voters
In terms of a voter’s problem, the only difference with respect to the simpler model
of previous sections is that now his consumption is indexed by h. Therefore, as


















− (πj − πC)2 (2.13)
The indifferent voter in group h may therefore be represented by the position
eπ(ght ), defined by
eπ(ght ) = E £V ¡ght+1¢ | I, ght ¤−E £V ¡ght+1¢ | C¤+ (πC)2 − (πI)22(πC − πI) (2.14)
Since ght affects the utility voters expect to receive if the incumbent is re-
elected, the indifferent position is a function of ght . Suppose, without loss of
generality, that πI < πC. Then, within group h, all individuals characterized
by πj < eπ(ght ) vote for the incumbent, while those with πj > eπ(ght ) vote for the
challenger.
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We can then measure the fraction of group h votes obtained by the incumbent
as a function of the pre-election expenditure observed by voters. Denoting this
fraction as φh(g
h
t ) and the lower bound of π











t ) = fh














2 (πC − πI)
#
(2.16b)
where the last equality uses equation (2.14). Note that groups differ in the
level of spending they receive, and as a result in the ideological position of the
indifferent voter eπ(ght ), as well as in the distribution fh. We choose the fhs to
be smooth functions, so that at no point a marginal increase in eπ(ght ) can bring
large masses of additional voters to the incumbent’s side. As a result of this and
the concavity of V (), φh is also concave.
φ0h(g
h
t ) measures the electoral benefit to the politician from directing an addi-
tional dollar to voters in group h. The size of this benefit depends on how much
that additional dollar expands the range of ideological positions where voters
prefer the incumbent, characterized by the position of the indifferent voter eπ(ght ).
If the utility voters expect to obtain under the incumbent in t + 1 increases,
eπ(ght ) increases (that is, moves closer to πC) and the range of supporters for the
incumbent expands. For a given change in expected utility, the increase of eπ(ght )
is smaller the further apart πC and πI are, as the cost to voters from having their
least preferred ideological position in power becomes larger.
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Besides the effect of an additional dollar on eπ(ght ), φ0h(ght ) also depends on
the mass of h voters at point eπ(ght ), which determines how many additional votes
the incumbent obtains from increasing eπ(ght ). This mass of voters is measured
by fh
¡eπ(ght )¢.
An important assumption here is that voters observe only the expenditures
targeted to their own group. This is close to the visibility argument: voters care
about certain types of government expenditure because these are the ones visible
to them. Probably the most familiar expression of this is regional targeting
of expenditures, where voters in one region do not directly observe the goods
provided to another.
2.3.2 The incumbent’s problem























where ρ, the probability of re-election, is now expressed as function of the fraction
of votes the incumbent receives, denoted as N
I
.
The incumbent assigns potentially different weights to voters in different
groups, which is the reason why those weights are now indexed by h. For any
group h, we assume that the weight ωhI is drawn from a distribution m(ω
h), and
ωh can take any value in a continuous interval [ωl,ωu] (where all values are pos-
itive). We assume that m(ωh) is the same for both incumbent and challenger
(that is, ωhC is also distributed according to m(ω
h)). We also assume that the
values of ωl and ωu, as well as the forms of V () and a(), are such that in the
post-election period politicians always choose interior solutions forK, gh1 and gh2 .
Without this assumption we would need to address limit cases, but the intuition
81
of electoral manipulation and resource allocation across groups would still be the
same.
For tractability, we consider ρ(N I) as a continuous increasing function. The
continuity of ρ(N I) is clearly inexact in a setting where elections are decided by
some majority voting rule, but it simply implies that candidates try to maximize
the number of supporters they have7. Moreover, we actually assume that ρ(N I)
is a linear function of the form ρ̄N I . Both of these assumptions imply that all
votes are equally important, and ignore the fact that candidates mainly want to
obtain a majority. This is certainly extreme, but it is not a crucial force behind
our results about how electoral transfers are allocated across groups of voters.
Assuming equal sized groups, the fraction of votes received by the incumbent,







Each period, the government faces the budget constraint:




7One of many reasons why this behavior can be optimal is a candidate’s uncertainty about
turnout: some voters that prefer him over his opponent may not turn out to vote, so that
it is optimal to have ample advantage. Another potential reason to justify the interest to
maximize votes is that larger political support increases the outside value of the candidate. We
do not formally model any of these reasons, but they provide a motivation for the assumptions
regarding ρ.
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As before, we solve the politician’s problem backwards. Without loss of gener-
ality, we focus on his targeting of a generic group h. If the incumbent is re-elected
for the post-election period, he chooses ght+1 according to the first order condition
(FOC):
ωhIV
0 ¡ght+1¢ = a0 (Kt+1) (2.19)
A re-elected incumbent therefore chooses spending good h as an increasing
function of the weight ωhI . As a result, the post-election utility an h voter in
receives if the incumbent is re-elected is also increasing in ωhI .






be the discounted value the incumbent expects
to obtain from an additional vote from group h, which we take as given, and
remember φh(ght ) is the share of group h’s votes that goes to the incumbent.
For the election period, the incumbent’s optimal choices are summarized by the
following proposition:
Proposition 6 The incumbent’s choice of policy in the pre-election period sat-
isfies the budget constraint (2.18) and
ωhIV
0 ¡ght ¢+ φ0h ¡ght ¢Λ = a0 (Kt) (2.20)
for h = h1, h2.
The left hand side of FOC (2.20) represents the benefit from a marginal in-
crease in ght . As in the post-election period, this benefit includes the utility gain
this change induces for group h voters. However, prior to an election the politi-
cian potentially derives an additional benefit from targeting group h, namely
obtaining more votes from this group’s voters.
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Note that a similar FOC applies for spending targeted to the other group.
Optimal choices of gh1t and g
h2


















The first important result is that targeted spending increases the share of votes
that goes to the incumbent, despite the fact that voters recognize the electoral
incentives faced by the incumbent. The following proposition states and proves
this result.









≤ 0. The incumbent would then get more votes by
reducing, or at least not increasing, targeted spending to group h. Larger ght in
this case cannot be driven by electoral motives, but by ωhI being high. Increases
in ght then lead voters in h to perceive higher ω
h
I and expect higher post-election





> 0. This contradicts the initial assumption.
The intuition behind this result is as in the simple model of previous sections.
High spending to a group could reflect electoral motives or a genuine preference
of the incumbent for that group. Voters cannot distinguish the true force behind
high observed transfers, and therefore assign some probability to being targeted
due to actual fiscal preferences rather than electoral reasons.
With respect to the post-electoral allocation of expenditures there is a pre-
electoral shift of government resources away from desks and into targeted spend-
ing. In other words, Kt < Kt+1. To see that this is the case, combine φ
h0 ¡ght ¢ > 0
with the fact that Kt+1 satisfies the post-election FOC (2.19). Given these two
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elements, if the incumbent chose Kt = Kt+1 the pre-election marginal benefit
of targeted spending would exceed that of desks. Since φh(), V (), and a() are
all concave (with a() possibly weakly concave), satisfying the pre-election FOC
(2.20) therefore requires lower non-targeted expenditure before the election.
The pre-electoral shift of resources toward targeted spending holds for any
realization of ωh1I and ω
h2
I , so that all types of politicians have incentives to change
the composition of expenditures prior to an election8. The main reason for the
difference with respect to the results above is that m(ω) is continuous, so that all
politicians want to increase targeting to separate from marginally lower types. In
this sense, the result of electoral manipulation by all types of politicians reflects a
more general representation of fiscal behavior. Note that another difference with
the results from above is that here Λ, the value of re-election, plays no role in
determining whether an incumbent follows electoral incentives in designing the
budget (although it determines the extent of the manipulation). This results from
ignoring the discontinuous character of the ρ(ght ) function, and should therefore
not be taken literally.
The more interesting question to address with this generalized framework is
how electoral motives change the allocation of resources across groups in the
pre-election period, compared to non-election periods. We will provide here an
intuitive discussion of how these resources are allocated. For this purpose, it is
useful to establish the post-election choice of fiscal policy as a benchmark against
which pre-election outcomes can be compared. This is the relevant benchmark
8This is true as long as incumbents always choose interior solutions for K, gh=1 and gh=2 in
the post-election period. As mentioned above, we have assumed that this is the case to avoid
dealing with the limit cases.
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because we are interested in comparing the composition of spending chosen before
the election to what would be chosen in the absence of electoral incentives. Since
we have designed the t+ 1 period to differ from t only in the electoral incentive,
the political budget cycle is given precisely by the difference between the t and
t + 1 fiscal choices. We will therefore start from the possibility that the t + 1
composition of spending is imposed in the t period.
The key determinant of how pre-electoral transfers are split between the two
groups is their relative potential to generate additional votes to the incumbent.








is crucial. Suppose also that, at the t+
1 levels of targeted spending, the incumbent would derive more electoral benefits














t+1 satisfy the FOC (2.19), and φ
0





























That is, if the t + 1 composition of spending is imposed in t, the marginal
benefit of expenditures targeted to any group exceeds that ofK, and the benefit of
directing one more dollar to gh1t exceeds that of directing it to g
h2
t . The incumbent
then has incentives to take one dollar out from non-targeted expenditures K,
and put it into gh1 , the most valuable form of targeted spending, while keeping
gh2 unchanged. This will increase the marginal benefit of desks (non-targeted
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spending), given the concavity of a(K). What happens to gh2t and the final effect



















are “close”. Then resources will only be
shifted from K into gh1 until gh1 = g0, where g0 satisfies













From this point, resources from K would be redirected toward both types of
targeted expenditure, now equally valuable, until the FOC’s (2.20) and (2.21) are
simultaneously satisfied. Compared to the post-election period, the equilibrium
composition of spending before the election would involve lower Kt and higher









are “far ” from each other. In this
case resources are shifted from Kt towards g
h1










Then, gh2t and Kt will both contract until the marginal benefits of all types
of spending are equated. In this case, relative to the post-election, only the
group that produces high electoral benefits will obtain larger targeted expenditure
before the election. The other group will actually receive gh2t < g
h2
t+1.
Note that, in the process of moving resources from K to the most productive








being “far” or “close” are
defined by whether equality is first achieved between the marginal benefit of gh1









are close enough that in equilibrium electoral transfers
are directed to both groups.
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A graphic representation may be useful. In figures 2.1 and 2.2, we present
distributions efh(gh) ≡ fh ¡eπ(gh)¢ for the two groups. These distributions repre-
sent the density at the type that would be indifferent between the incumbent and
the challenger if ght = g
h. The thicker line is efh1 and the thin line represents efh2 .
For this figures, we have assumed that ωh1I = ω
h2





As a result, the only difference between φ0h1 (gt+1) and φ
0
h2
(gt+1) comes from the
different shapes of the f function at the position of the eπ(ght+1) voter. To match
the assumption that φ0h1 (gt+1) > φ
0
h2
(gt+1) in the graph, efh1 (gt+1) > efh2 (gt+1).
In case 1 above, represented by Figure 2.1, while keeping gh2 at gt+1, resources
are shifted from K into gh1 until a point such as g0. At this point, the distance
between fh2(gt+1) and fh1(g0) has become quite modest, and it just compensates
the utility gap that has been created between the two groups. As a result, it is
valuable to start pumping resources into group h2 as well. In case 2, however,
the distance between the two distributions is much larger (Figure 2.2). The point
g1, at which the marginal benefits of gh1 = g1 and gh2 = gt+1 are equal, is much
larger than g0. As a consequence, the incumbent is unwilling to reduce desks as
much as necessary to provide g1 to group h1 and gt+1 to group h2. Rather than
reducing desks until gh1=g1, at some g < g1 the incumbent starts to also take
resources away from group h2.
In short, if targeting a given group of voters is much more beneficial for
electoral purposes than targeting the other, resources will be shifted to the more
favorable group not only from desks but also from the other group. However, both
groups could receive higher expenditure before the election if they are relatively
similar in terms of providing electoral benefits. Notice that we evaluate how
beneficial a group is in electoral terms at the post-election level of spending.
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Figure 2.1: Case 1: φh1(gt+1) close to φh2(gt+1)




Figure 2.2: Case 2: φh1(gt+1) far from φh2(gt+1)
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(see equation 2.16a), the number of votes the incumbent can raise
from targeting a specific group above the post-election level depends on both the
distribution of the group along the “ideology” dimension, and the expenditure
the group would receive if no elections were imminent. The first element is
captured by the shape of the fh(π) function. The second determines the position
of the indifferent voter. If, for instance, ωh1I is large, so that h1 receives high
spending even in the absence of electoral incentives, transferring more resources
to that group would only raise a few votes, because even without those additional





is relatively low, because an increase in gh1t above g
h1
t+1 would only
have a small effect in the position of the indifferent voter.









ciently close” that both groups receive pre-electoral transfers, or “sufficiently far
apart” that one of the groups actually does worse before the election than after
it, depends on the specific functional forms of V () and a(). For instance, we will









close” no matter what the other parameters and functional forms are. The reason
is that reducing K below its post-election level does not increase the marginal
benefit of desks, so that satisfying the pre-election FOC (2.20) for h2 requires
giving electoral transfers to this group as well.
We should note that the results obtained in the simpler model still hold here.
The extent of electoral manipulation of policy is increasing in the share of votes
the incumbent can raise by engaging in it; political business cycles are likely to
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be more intense in more “swing” societies, and core groups of voters receive less
targeting than other groups. The main difference in this setting is that it is now
clear that we focus on the fraction of voters that are swing “at the post-election
levels of spending”. Only voters close to the indifferent ideological position are
willing to shift their votes facing a marginal change in policy, but that indifferent
position is in turn a function of policy. The relevant question is thus whether the
mass of voters close to the indifferent position at a given composition of spending
is large.
2.3.3 Voters’ expectations and the impact of fiscal policy
on vote shares
The discussion above characterizes how are electoral transfers (the additional
resources dedicated to targeted spending before elections) allocated across groups.
This allocation is a function of the additional share of votes an incumbent can
























. The intuition is simple: voters are led by fiscal policy to support
the incumbent only if the policy increases their expected well-being under the
incumbent. Until now, we have abstracted from a careful analysis of voters’




. We address these issues now. This analysis
also sheds light on the role played by voters receiving imperfect information about
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fh.
The basic logic behind voters’ beliefs is that they formulate expectations about
their future well-being under each candidate optimally using all information avail-
able to them. In particular, voters in any group h can solve the politician’s prob-
lem for each possible value of ωhI , and know precisely how their future utility under
the incumbent relates to ωhI . At the same time, they have imperfect information




















. This is summarized in










to highlight that ωhI is
the determinant of their future utility voters are trying to infer from their current
observation of government expenditure.










. Voters ’beliefs about their future































Proof. This follows from FOC (2.20) and (2.22)
Note that, by plugging φ0h(g
h









as a first order, non-linear, differential equation. This equation cap-
tures how voters’ beliefs affect electoral outcomes, and therefore the choice of
policy, and how policy in turn affects their beliefs. Note also the important role
of imperfect information about fh(π). Voters in group h know that the extent to
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which ght reflects electoral motivations, rather than fiscal preferences, depends on
how productive for electoral purposes is h. If voters knew h is highly attractive
from an electoral perspective, they would see ght as a very noisy signal about ω
h
I ,
and this would in turn reduce the incentives to the incumbent to deliver high ght .
The extent of the political budget cycle is thus magnified by the fact that politi-
cians are better informed than the public about which types of publicly provided
goods generate the largest electoral benefits.





izing equilibrium outcomes for this general case is difficult. At the same time,
observing solutions for some specific cases helps to clarify the intuition. We
therefore resort to a specific example where we illustrate the equilibrium.
2.3.4 An example
Take the following specific assumptions about functional forms: a (K) = θK,




= ln gh. Suppose also that, for any politician
P (P = I, C), ωhP follows a uniform distribution with values between ω
l = 0.2
and ωu = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that πI = −πC. We pick a
value πC = 0.25, which will save some notation. We assume
fh (π) = αh exp (− |π|)






. This distribution has the nice feature of being concen-







h are, respectively, the upper and lower bound
for π in group h. Figure 2.3 depicts fh (π) for different values of π̄h: the crosses
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correspond to π̄h = 0.3 (αh = 1.93), the solid line to π̄h = 0.75 (αh = 0.95) and
the diamonds to π̄h = 1 (αh = 0.79).
Figure 2.3: fh(π) for different values of π̄h
We assume that both voters and the incumbent know one of the two groups
is characterized by αh = α and the other by αh = α. To capture asymmetric in-
formation about the political environment, however, only politicians know which
group corresponds to each value of α, while voters simply assign some probability
pαh that group h is the one with α: Pr(α
h = α) = pαh .
From the FOC’s (2.19) and (2.20) the incumbent’s optimal choices for ght+1


















, where this solution is consistent with
voters rationally forming expectations. The first step is to re-write the incum-
bent’s FOC (2.24) to explicitly note that it depends on individuals’s expectations.
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Note that Y (ght ) is the component of φ
h0 ¡ghI ¢ affected by voters’s expectations,
so our analysis of their beliefs will focus on Y (ght ). Also, ex-ante incumbent and
challenger are identical, so ωhC follows the same unconditional distribution that




is formed according to that unconditional distribu-
tion.
Voters unveil the relationship between ωhI and g
h
I from the FOC (2.24), and





























It is clear from this expression that one key reason why voters respond to pre-
electoral manipulation is their lack of information about αh, which determines
how attractive from the electoral point of view is a given group. In this example, if
the αh were known to voters, they could perfectly infer ωhI from their observation
of ght , and increases in g
h





by taking logs of both sides of (2.26), and using
Pr(αh = ᾱ) = pᾱh. Writing these expectations in terms of Y (g
h
t ), we obtain:






















¤pαh £1 + αΛ
θ
Y 0(ght )
¤(1−pαh )´−1 if ght > ḡ
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.27)








if and only if gt ≤ ḡ.9 This is
the first order differential equation that characterizes voters’ beliefs. Note that
expression (2.26) represents the incumbent’s optimal choice of ght given voters’ ex-
pectations, while expression (2.27) represents voters’ rational expectations, given
the incumbent’s actions. Equilibrium outcomes are therefore represented by a
function Y (ght ) that solves expression (2.27), and the choice of g
h
t that satisfies
(2.26) for that Y (ght ). Those equilibrium outcomes, which we illustrate below,
are summarized in proposition 9.




is increasing in ght was proved for the general case in previous





as a conjecture, which will then prove consistent with the politicians’ choices.
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Proposition 9 In this example, voters’ equilibrium expectations about the future
are characterized by
E(lnωhI | ght )
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩

























if ght > ḡ
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.28)

































Proof. See appendix B.
We can now illustrate this solution10. Take the following set of parameters:
ω ∼ U [0.2 , 1], T = 1, θ = 1.3, αh1 = 1.93 (or π̄h1 = 0.3), αh2 = 0.79 (or
π̄h1 = 1), pα
h1=ᾱ = 0.5, and Λ = 0.1. The choice of Λ is consistent, for instance,
with11 β = 0.99, ρ = 1 and ΩIt+1 − Ω
I(P=C)
t+1 = 0.11, where the latter would be
10Note that the solution for the upper branch of E(lnωhI | ght ) is an approximation, since it
involves linearizing the differential equation around the E(lnωhI | ght ) = E(lnωhC) point (see
appendix).
11β = 0.99 corresponds to a discount rate of 0.01, which is consistent with historical records
of quartely interest rates.
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satisfied by combinations of ωh1I and ω
h2
I such as 0.3 and 0.9 or 0.5 and 0.45.
These parameters imply ḡ = 0.53.
The solution to the problem can be summarized by φ0(ght ), the first order




depict them in the following three figures.
Figure 2.4 shows φ0(ght ) for the two groups. Keep in mind that φ
0(ght ) repre-
sents the additional h votes the incumbent can obtain from raising ght one dollar.
The top line in that figure corresponds to the group with more swing voters,
which in this case is h1 since it has the larger αh. The larger effect on votes
for the more swing group is consistent with our previous result that electoral
incentives to target swing groups are large, compared to more core groups. Note
also that φ0(ght ) is positive and (weakly) decreasing everywhere, reflecting the
fact that the incumbent can always obtain more h votes by increasing ght , but
the electoral gain tends to decrease as ght grows. In other words, the share of
group h votes the incumbent obtains, given by φ(ght ), is increasing and (weakly)
concave. The positive slope shows the incentive for electoral increases in targeted
spending. The concavity is a consequence of decreasing marginal utility, and less
concentration of voters in the tails of the πh distribution. In fact, note that the
decreasing pattern of φ0(ght ) is less pronounced for group h2 (bottom line), which
exhibits a πh distribution with fatter tails.










Figure 2.4: φ0(gh1t ) and φ
0(gh2t )
This representation is useful because the FOC then looks very similar to the
FOC for the post-election period. The only difference is the last term of the right
hand side. We depict both the pre-election and the post-election FOC’s in Figure




, is given by the decreasing dotted curves for different
values of ωhI . From bottom to top, these curves correspond to ω
h
I = 0.2, ω
h
I = 0.4,
ωhI = 0.6 and ω
h
I = 0.8. Meanwhile, the dashed horizontal line corresponds to
the right hand side of the t+ 1 FOC (which is given simply by θ). The two solid
curves represent the right hand side of the period t FOC for the two groups: the
bottom one represents the case of the more swing group (h1), which we already
noted exhibits the larger φh0 for any ght .
Take, for instance, group h1. The incumbent’s optimal choice of g
h1
t is given
by the intersection between the θ − Λφh10 (g) line (bottom solid line) and the
ωhI
gh
curve. Meanwhile, his optimal choice of gh1t+1 is at the intersection of the




curve (since ωhI does not change between
t and t + 1). Note that, for any given ωhI , both groups receive larger targeted
expenditures before the election than after it (ght > g
h
t+1 for both h). In this case,
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Figure 2.5: Incumbent’s first order conditions
as discussed above, the constant marginal utility of desks precludes the possibility
that one of the groups receives less targeted spending before the election than in
t+ 1.
The size of pre-electoral transfers (the difference between ght and g
h
t+1) is larger
for group h1, characterized by a larger mass of swing voters. The differences
between the two groups, however, become smaller for larger values of ght , since
at these levels voters already perceive high benefits of choosing the incumbent
(note that the two curves grow closer as g increases). In other words, given
decreasing marginal utility, providing voters with additional expenditures in the
high g region has only small effects in the well-being they expect to enjoy if the
incumbent is re-elected. These results are reflected in Figure 2.6, which shows
the optimal choice of ght as a function of ω
h
I .
The extent to which pre- and post-electoral policy differ (i.e. the size of the
political budget cycle) obviously depends on the specific parameters chosen. For
instance, larger values of Λ imply a larger value of re-election, and therefore
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lead the incumbent to chose larger ght . Small values of θ imply that the post-
election level of targeted expenditure is already high (for any candidate) and,
given decreasing marginal utility, reduce the potential differences between one
and another candidate in terms of provision of targeted goods. This reduces
the incentives for electoral increases of ght . Larger ideological gaps between the
different candidates reduce the importance voters give to fiscal policy in choosing
the candidate, and therefore reduce the incentives for electoral increases of ght .
Different choices of αh1 and αh2 will change the electoral benefit the incumbent
can obtain from increasing ght , as can be deduced from the figures above. The




This paper has used the widely held view that politicians favor the interests
of certain specific groups of voters to explain the emergence of political budget
cycles in a model with rational voters. In the model, voters use past fiscal policy
to learn information about which groups and types of spending the incumbent is
likely to favor after the election, if he is re-elected. The result is a pattern of pre-
electoral shifts of government resources from non-targeted types of expenditures
toward goods specific groups of voters care more about. Pre-electoral transfers are
mostly directed to undecided groups of voters, while groups that are committed
to one or other candidate may even face negative transfers. A key feature of the
model is that, even though voters are rational and predict this behavior, they
respond to electoral manipulation, since they cannot observe whether they are
being targeted because they are crucial to the incumbent’s re-election or because
they are genuinely liked.
Our view differs from other models of political budget cycles in that voters’
care about the preferences of incumbents over different interest groups, rather
than his competence. This focus is motivated by traditional political practices
in the management of the government’s budget, which suggest an important
role for special interests in electoral budget manipulation. Although the idea
of pork barrel politics is no strange to the political economy arena, it has not
been previously incorporated in intertemporal models of fiscal policy-making.
Furthermore, previous literature does not address the question of why providing
pork spending would affect the votes of rational, forward-looking, individuals.
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Chapter 3
On Political Budget Cycles and Voters as Fiscal
Conservatives: Evidence From the Colombian Experience
3.1 Introduction
Common wisdom is that, as elections approach, elected officials increase govern-
ment spending to improve the chances that they or their parties will be reelected.
It is not unusual to hear reports of pork spending growing in election years, and
the public seems to expect popular spending projects when elections are im-
minent. For economists, however, the debate about the existence, extent and
characteristics of this manipulation is hardly settled. Among the many sticky
points, there are inconsistencies between the idea of pre-electoral increases in
the government’s budget and both the actual dynamics of government spending
and the behavior of voters. First, evidence of election-year increases in govern-
ment spending and the deficit is at best mixed. Second, increases of the size of
the budget seem to hurt, rather than improve, an incumbent’s chances of being
re-elected.
Partly motivated by this empirical evidence, the model introduced in previ-
ous pages presents a view where political budget cycles (PBC) take the form
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of a change in the composition, rather than the size, of government spending.
Before elections, specific groups of voters are targeted with spending, while non-
targeted types of expenditure contract. Behind the model is the idea that voters
dislike deficits, but like receiving goods specifically targeted to them. Voters re-
act to fiscal policy because it provides information about the amount of targeted
expenditure the incumbent will provide in the future if re-elected.
This view of electoral cycles suggests that empirical analyses of the PBC that
focus solely on the dynamics of the overall budget —as is the case in most of the
literature— are at risk of misinterpreting the evidence, besides missing an impor-
tant part of the action. For one, electoral manipulation of government expendi-
tures may occur without impacting the overall budget or the deficit. Moreover,
the effect of elections on the dynamics of government spending is inextricably
linked to the preferences of voters. These may vary from country to country, and
learning about them is crucial for an adequate interpretation of the evolution of
the budget around election times. Put simply, even contractions of government
expenditure may be consistent with electoral incentives, if they are what the
preferences of voters dictate.
In this chapter, I use data on government expenditures and electoral outcomes
in Colombia to examine the characteristics of PBCs, in terms of both voting be-
havior and government spending1. I ask whether election outcomes are consistent
with voters having different preferences toward different types of government ex-
penditure. I also examine if it is rational for voters to believe that fiscal choices
reflect persistent characteristics of officials, an assumption behind most models
1This paper focuses solely on the electoral manipulation of government expenditures, without
dealing with potential electoral cycles in the revenue side.
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of PBCs with rational voters. From the point of view of policy, meanwhile, I
look at evidence on pre-electoral changes of government expenditures. Special
emphasis is put on the separate analysis of different types of government expen-
diture, since both the popular Rogoff (1990) model and the model introduced in
chapter 2 suggest the potential importance of composition effects. I finally tackle
the question of whether the extent of electoral effects on fiscal policy depends on
the degree of party polarization among voters.
This chapter is organized as follows. I begin by discussing some relevant em-
pirical literature in section 3.2. Section 3.3 comments on some interesting features
of the Colombian case. The pre-electoral dynamics of government spending are
analyzed in section 3.4, while section 3.5 studies the effect of fiscal behavior on
election outcomes. These two sections introduce the data and tools necessary to
examine the effect of party polarization on the electoral budget cycle, which is
done in section 3.6. In section 3.7 I analyze whether the dynamics of expenditure
are consistent with the idea that the fiscal preferences of officials exhibit some in-
ertia. While all other empirical sections focus on Colombian municipalities, some
evidence at the central government level is introduced in section 3.8. Finally,
section 3.9 provides some concluding remarks.
3.2 A discussion of previous literature
Two bodies of past empirical work are relevant for the questions I address in this
chapter: literature on fiscal preferences of voters, and literature on the dynamics
of fiscal policy around election times.
The first of these branches of work examines how fiscal policy affects the
incumbent’s chances of being reelected. Brender (2003) uses data on the elections
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of local mayors in Israel, and estimates a model where the probability of reelection
of the mayor is a function of his budget choices. He finds that voters penalize
election year increases in deficits, but also that they reward high expenditure
in development projects. Peltzman (1992) shows that, in the US, the share of
votes received by the incumbent’s party is decreasing in government current (as
opposed to capital) expenditures. This result, however, loses power if investment
in roads, an important component of public investment, is included in the policy
variable2. For OECD countries, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) find that
governments that adopt tight fiscal policies do not suffer falls in popularity and
are not penalized by voters in the polls. In short, this literature suggests that
elected officials do not receive electoral benefits from boosting spending before
elections. If anything, the opposite seems to be true. However, not all types of
government spending generate the same opposition: some development projects
actually appear to increase political support for the incumbent.
A second group of relevant empirical papers examines the dynamics of fiscal
policy, looking for systematic changes that coincide with election times. The
most comprehensive studies are those by Schuknecht (1994), Shi and Svensson
(2000), Persson and Tabellini (2002), and Brender and Drazen (2003). Except
for Schuknecht’s paper, this work focuses solely on aggregate measures of fiscal
policy: total spending3, tax revenue, and deficits. Using data for 35 developing
2The author interprets the “odd findings” obtained when including expenditure in roads as
a result of the high lumpiness of this component. An alternative interpretation, consistent with
the model introduced above, is that roads are clearly targeted public goods and voters react
favorably to being targeted by the incumbent.
3The measure of spending used in Shi and Svensson’s paper is actually government consump-
tion spending from national accounts. I find results with this measure difficult to interpret as
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countries over the years 1970-1992, Schuknecht (1994) finds that overall fiscal
balances worsen during an election year, due to an increase in total government
spending. Shi and Svensson (2000) study a sample of 123 developed and underde-
veloped countries over a horizon of 20 years. They find that deficits grow before
elections in both developed and developing countries, but the electoral effects
are particularly strong in developing economies. Moreover, spending shows pre-
electoral increases in their sample of developing countries, but not in developed
economies.
Later results, however, are not so favorable to the existence of electoral cycles
in total government spending. Brender and Drazen (2003) show that the find-
ing of PBCs in total spending is driven solely by new democracies: there is no
evidence of electoral manipulation in countries with a long history of democratic
institutions. They argue that fiscal cycles in new democracies reflect underdevel-
oped media and poor accounting practices. Persson and Tabellini (2002), with
data for 60 countries for 1960-1998, study if PBC’s vary across political systems.
They find no effect of elections on government expenditure or surplus for the over-
all sample, and a pre-electoral contraction of government spending in countries
with majoritarian electoral rules. In sum, the evidence in favor of pre-electoral
increases in total government spending and government deficits is, at best, mixed.
Furthermore, it seems that politicians only engage in spending hikes when vot-
ers cannot effectively monitor government balances, a behavior that is consistent
with voters being opposed to raising overall spending.
In terms of the composition of expenditures, Schuknecht finds that, prior to
it includes different levels of government (local, national, publicly owned enterprises), which
should respond to different types of elections and in different ways.
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elections, capital expenditures rise as a share of both GDP and overall expendi-
ture. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) find no pre-electoral increases in aggregate
spending for Canadian provinces, but do find that what they call “visible expen-
ditures”, mostly capital expenses such as construction of roads and structures,
grow in election periods. They also find that spending in social services, in-
dustrial development, and health actually contract before elections. Very similar
findings are reported for Mexico by M. González (2001), who also finds that other
categories of spending, such as current transfers, contract prior to elections. In
short, pre-electoral manipulation of the budget is concentrated in some specific
categories of government spending. For the countries covered in these studies,
it would appear that capital expenditures are seen by politicians as an effective
way to impress voters, and that officials attempt to take advantage of this fact4.
Moreover, officials seem to find ways to increase these expenditures prior to elec-
tions without increasing overall spending, thus avoiding being penalized by voters
who are fiscal conservatives.
The picture that emerges from this findings is a confusing one, at least in
light of the widespread idea that officials expand government expenditure prior
to elections. On one hand, voters seem to penalize such increases, and there is no
robust evidence that overall spending is manipulated in this way. On the other,
expenditure increases are actually observed for some types of spending. The main
contribution of this paper is to put these apparently contradictory pieces together
and show how they can be reconciled. In contrast to previous work, I analyze
4Alesina et al. (1998) assert that “cuts in public invesment are less visible and [politically]
costly [than cuts in other spending] ”, but provide no evidence that this is the case. The
evidence just discussed, as well as the results I present in this paper, point in the opposite
direction, at least for the countries covered by these studies.
108
both voting behavior and the dynamics of government budgets as two parts of the
same problem, and focus on the idea that not all types of government spending
should be treated equally in this analysis. My results suggest that the model put
forward in the previous chapter can serve as a unifying framework with which
to understand the diverse findings from these branches of the empirical litera-
ture. This paper also proposes that some specific components of the government
accounts are more likely than others to reflect what the previous chapter calls
targeted expenditure, that is, expenditure that generates large effects in electoral
support. In that spirit, another contribution of this paper is a systematic analy-
sis of differential effects of elections on the various components of overall public
spending.
3.3 The Colombian case
Colombia offers an interesting case for the study of these issues, as an example of
a developing economy with a relatively well established democracy5. Electoral cy-
cles in the overall budget have long been considered a phenomenon of developing
countries. This is partly because of the idea that incumbents increase spending
to boost economic activity, a tool that is considered specially powerful in less de-
veloped economies. However, if the engine behind PBC is the use of fiscal policy
5The statement that Colombia is a “well established democracy” may be puzzling for the
reader, in view of the intense armed conflict that has bled the country for years. However, from
the point of the institutional regime, Colombia has enjoyed the rule of democracy practically
without interruption since the 19th century. This is not a minor achievement in the Latin
American context, where most countries went through long and painful periods under the rule
of dictators, even in the last decades of the 20th century.
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as a signal about characteristics of the incumbent (as theoretical models suggest)
the crucial distinction is not between richer and poorer countries, but between
older, well established, democracies and their younger counterparts. This is so
because voters in an established democracy have greater ability to monitor the
fiscal choices of officials. In such democracy, therefore, the fiscal preferences of
voters should impose constraints on the specific form the PBC takes. If vot-
ers are fiscal conservatives, we should not observe pre-election deficit increases
in an old democracy, even if the country lags in economic development (this is
consistent with the evidence in Brender and Drazen, 2003). The contrast with
the traditional view of “unconditional” manipulation of the budget in developing
economies, makes countries like Colombia a particularly interesting ground to
examine the link between the preferences of voters and electoral manipulation of
government spending.
Although I do present some evidence on the central government’s budget, the
main focus in this paper is on spending behavior by local governments. I choose
this “cross-district” approach, rather than the more usual cross-country strategy
for two reasons. First, the PBC model of chapter 2 suggests the importance
of distinguishing between targeted and non-targeted types of expenditure. This
distinction is most relevant at the local level, where expenses can be targeted most
efficiently. Second, the extent of cross sectional differences in institutional settings
is much larger in a multi-country setting than it is for cross sectional units within
the same country. This is specially clear with respect to constitutional rules,
national laws, electoral and judicial systems, and monetary policy, all of which
are important determinants of the existence and strength of political budgetary
cycles. Most important of all, the view in this paper is that the fiscal preferences
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of voters play a key role in determining the PBC. This creates the potential for
widely different forms of electoral budget manipulations from country to country,
and suggests the convenience of limiting the analysis to a single country, where
general features of the political system that are difficult to control for do not vary.
Note that the within-country strategy does not wipe out the sources of variation
in the institutional environment that are necessary to identify key characteristics
of the PBC; in particular, the degree of ideological commitment to one or other
party does exhibit wide variation across districts of the same country.
I should point that, although in Colombia the direct reelection of incumbent
executive officials is banned, pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal finances is re-
garded as a usual political practice. PBCs are thought to arise in Colombia
largely due to the actions of the legislative bodies, whose members are in fact
subject to direct re-election (in the case of city councils), or at least have found
ways to circumvent formal restrictions to run for direct re-election (as in the
national Congress). There are also reasons why even an incumbent mayor, who
cannot run for re-election immediately, would want to manipulate fiscal policy at
the end of his period in office. Most importantly, voters identify the preferences
of the official with those of his party, and therefore the policy decisions of an
official are interpreted as signals of party preferences and competence. Hence,
the incumbent knows that his decisions affect his party’s re-election chances.
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3.4 The electoral dynamics of government spend-
ing
In this section, I analyze evidence of pre-electoral manipulation of public spending
in Colombian municipalities, with special emphasis on contrasting different types
of expenditure. In particular, the model introduced in previous pages suggests
important differences between targeted expenditures and other components of
the budget. I try to unveil such differences using the disaggregate components of
government accounts.
A classification of government expenditure into targeted and non-targeted
expenses is not readily available, or straightforward. In fact, all government
expenses (probably with the exception of interest payments on external debt)
generate benefits for at least some groups in society, even if it is only to those
individuals who provide the services and goods to the government. However,
my view is that some of the components of expenditure that governments report
separately, in particular most categories of investment expenditures, are more
likely to reflect what I call targeted expenses than others.
Opportunistic targeted expenditures, close to the familiar concept of pork
spending, are most often associated with projects of infrastructure development:
construction of roads, schools, water plants. These are highly visible expendi-
tures that benefit specific (yet potentially large) groups of voters. In Kneebone
and McKenzie’s (2001) words, infrastructure spending fits the “caricature of the
opportunistic politician building roads, hockey rinks and schools just prior to
elections”. On the other hand, some current expenditures, such as purchases of
supplies and services and payments to other governmental entities, can be pre-
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sumably cut without visibly hurting large groups of voters. Data that separates
current government spending from expenditures linked to development projects
could therefore fit the need for distinguishing targeted from non-targeted expen-
ditures, and would also distinguish visible from non-visible spending, which is
relevant in some models of PBC (e.g. Rogoff’s 1990 model).
I use a panel of yearly data on government accounts for all municipalities in
Colombia over the 1984-2000 period. Expenditures are reported at a relatively
high level of detail, allowing me to discern the behavior of different types of
spending. Following much of the literature, I estimate equations in which the
policy variables are represented as functions of the timing of elections, as well as
other controls. The basic relationship can be written as:
yit = ai + b ∗ yit−1 +
X
k
ck ∗ xk,it + d ∗ elecdumit + εit (3.1)
where i is an index for districts, yit is some specific type of spending by the local
government of city i in period t, ai is a district effect, and the x are control
variables (indexed by k to allow the use of more than one control). The variable
elecdum is a political dummy that captures the timing of elections, and it is
the central variable in the analysis. This variable takes a value of 1 in periods
preceding local elections, and 0 in all other periods. The error term is white
noise. The autoregressive form is used in the literature on political cycles as
a parsimonious representation of the policy choices, given the lack of elements
to incorporate a fully structural model of fiscal policy. However, I also include
additional controls to account for as much variability in the data as I can. I
estimate a separate regression for each type of government expenditure (that is,
each type of government expenditure is a different y). In all regressions, the main
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interest is d, the coefficient that captures the effect of elections.
The traditional view of political budget cycles is that we should observe pre-
electoral increases in overall spending and at least some of its disaggregate cat-
egories (d > 0 for at least some y0s, d < 0 for no category). This is the kind of
evidence previous empirical studies have attempted to find. Theoretical models,
however, suggest the possibility that the PBC takes the form of a change in the
composition, rather than the size, of the budget. In Rogoff’s (1990) model of
competence signaling, as an election approaches incumbents expand the provi-
sion of visible goods and contract that of less visible goods. For a given level
of competence of the incumbent, this implies more spending in visible projects
and less spending in other government tasks. Meanwhile, the model introduced
in the previous chapter postulates a pre-electoral shift in government resources
away from non-targeted spending and into targeted projects. Given the discus-
sion above, both models would be consistent with some components of current
spending contracting prior to elections, with a simultaneous expansion of cate-
gories related to development projects6.
6In Rogoff’s paper visible spending is called government “consumption”, while the less vis-
ible good, which the author identifies as spending in national defense and financial activities,
is referred to as “government investment”. When taking the model to the data, this choice of
words may be misleading, at least for some countries. In the Colombian case, less visible expen-
ditures such as defense, payments to pensioned employees, and office supplies are all recorded
under the consumption or “current spending” categories. Highly visible types of projects, like
the construction of bridges, schools, and water plants, are all under the “investment” heading.
The multi-period character of these projects raises a question about whether politicians are able
to time them so that voters observe them before the election. Common wisdom, the existing
empirical evidence, and the evidence I present here all seem to suggest that they are.
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3.4.1 Data
The data consist of annual observations for each Colombian municipality (close
to 1100 cross-sectional units) for the period 1984-2000. Of the 18 years in the
sample, 6 are local election years, when mayors and city councils are elected7.
Elections occur at predetermined dates, and all cities hold elections the same day.
Mayors have been elected by popular vote only since 1988. In previous years,
the Colombian administrative system was highly centralized, with the president
appointing governors and governors appointing mayors. From the late eighties,
however, a gradual decentralization process has taken place both in the fiscal and
the administrative fronts. Since 1988 mayors and governors have been elected
by the people, and local officials now have many fiscal responsibilities that in
previous decades were in the hands of the central government. The timing of
the election dummy is such that the pre-election period is the year previous to
the election if the election takes place in the first semester, and the year of the
election if the election is held in the second semester.
In terms of government spending, I use data from the Colombian Contraloría
General, a public entity with the task of monitoring public finances. Since the use
of these data is a novel feature of this paper, I will discuss features of the database
in some detail. The financial reports local governments file with the Contraloría
contain a detailed description of the revenues and expenditures of the regional
government, so disaggregate measures are available. The general structure of
the expenditure accounts available is summarized in the first column of Table
3.1 (the label I use for each account below is listed in the second column). Note
7Mayors and councils are elected simultaneously. A list of the local elections held in the
1988-2000 period is presented in the appendix.
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Type of Expenditure Name
Total Expenditure TOTAL
1. Current Expenditure CURRENT
     1.1. General Payments GENERAL
     1.2. Personnel Expenditure PERSONNEL
     1.3. Current Transfers TRANSFERS
2. Investment INVESTMENT
     2.1. Infrastructure INFRASTRUCTURE
     2.2. Water, Energy, and Comunications POWER
     2.3. Housing HOUSING
     2.4. Education EDUCATION
     2.5. Health HEALTH
     2.6. Others OTH_INV
3. Interest payments INTEREST
Table 3.1: Composition of spending
that the Colombian government accounts designate as “Investment” items that in
many other countries are known as capital expenditure8. Besides the categories
listed in Table 3.1, I also examine investment in roads, which is a subcomponent of
infrastructure investment. The reason for highlighting this specific subcomponent
is that construction of roads is regarded as a particularly popular way to raise
votes prior to an election9.
Infrastructure development projects show up mostly in the investment cat-
egories. Given the discussion above, I associate these categories with targeted
expenditures.
Not all districts report all levels of disaggregation, or in all years. I use all
8In the category “Infrastructure” I include expenditures listed under roads, urban infras-
tructure, and construction of market places.
9For instance, there are several anecdotes in Colombia about mayors who insisted in inau-
gurating bridges not fully finished because their terms were nearing an end. The result were
poor quality bridges that ended up causing waves of accidents, or even collapsing.
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the available information, with numbers of observations as reported in Table 3.2.
Current expenditure and its broader subcategories, as well as total investment,
are available for more than 90% of the districts in years prior to 1997, and for
close to 80% of the districts after that. The disaggregation of investment is only
available since 199010.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the different categories of spending
I analyze. For each type of expenditure, statistics in the first row refer to all
periods, statistics in the second row are for pre-electoral periods, and statistics
in the third row are for other periods. All measures are in 1998 prices. Notice
that most current expenditure categories display lower averages in pre-electoral
periods that in other periods, while the opposite is true for most investment
categories, in particular those associated with the development of infrastructure
(infrastructure, water and energy, housing). These observations suggest pre-
electoral changes in the composition of spending, in directions consistent with the
predictions of both the Rogoff (1990) model and the budget composition model
of chapter 2. A more formal analysis is undertaken in the following section.
The dynamics of different categories of government spending can be seen in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The former contrasts current spending, and its subcompo-
nents, with investment. The latter shows the different categories of investment,
for the period in which disaggregated data is available (1990-2000). Vertical dot-
ted lines indicate pre-election years, as defined by the variable elecdum. Note,
in particular, peaks in pre-election periods for infrastructure, road construction,
10When disaggregations are reported, I check for consistency between reports of total invest-
ment and the sum of its disagregate categories. I do the same for current spending and its
subcategories. In both cases, inconsistencies arise in less of 1% of observations, and I discard


















Current Current transfers Investment Personnel General
Figure 3.1: Evolution of spending: broad categories
housing, and investment in energy and water plants.
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Type of Number of Standard
expenditure observations deviation
All 12,318            56,502            611,645          
TOTAL Pre-electoral 5,289              53,490            586,284          
No pre-electoral 7,029              58,769            630,088          
All 12,317            19,872            185,560          
CURRENT Pre-electoral 5,288              18,535            177,053          
No pre-electoral 7,029              20,877            191,717          
All 12,248            4,071              21,020            
GENERAL Pre-electoral 5,239              3,853              21,924            
No pre-electoral 7,009              4,234              20,317            
All 12,249            9,767              82,734            
PERSONNEL Pre-electoral 5,240              9,202              80,848            
No pre-electoral 7,009              10,190            84,120            
All 12,230            5,900              91,405            
TRANSFERS Pre-electoral 5,229              5,074              78,942            
No pre-electoral 7,001              6,518              99,703            
All 12,318            30,151            382,388          
INVESTMENT Pre-electoral 5,289              29,187            365,595          
No pre-electoral 7,029              30,876            394,578          
All 5,265              3,173              8,257              
INFRASTRUCTURE Pre-electoral 2,005              3,526              7,375              
No pre-electoral 3,260              2,955              8,750              
All 7,451              2,617              7,264              
ROADS Pre-electoral 2,837              2,943              6,865              
No pre-electoral 4,614              2,417              7,492              
All 5,563              3,707              6,168              
POWER Pre-electoral 2,111              4,273              7,103              
No pre-electoral 3,452              3,360              5,490              
All 7,351              762                 4,073              
HOUSING Pre-electoral 2,794              882                 4,622              
No pre-electoral 4,557              688                 3,695              
All 7,455              3,612              5,523              
EDUCATION Pre-electoral 2,840              3,882              5,827              
No pre-electoral 4,615              3,446              5,322              
All 7,455              2,710              5,010              
HEALTH Pre-electoral 2,840              2,934              5,262              
No pre-electoral 4,615              2,572              4,844              
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of spending: investment categories
Table 3.3 lists the different control variables I use in alternative specifications.
Note that most controls are timed in the previous year, since I expect these
past outcomes to influence the incumbent’s fiscal choices in the current period.
This timing should also address concerns relating potential endogeneity of these
regressors.
I use different specifications, with alternative sets of controls, to analyze the
robustness of the results. Specification (1) includes state per capita GDP to con-
trol for economic activity (GDP_PC), a quadratic time trend (T)11, and some
11I use trend variables, rather than time-specific dummies, because of the difficulty of con-
ceptually separating PBC effects from other year effects (besides, obviously, the mechanical
impossibility of identifying separate coefficients for all years plus the electoral dummy). For
instance, there are arguments, beyond the scope of this paper, that would imply PBC-related
effects on spending in years after elections. The difficulty with this data is that, because of
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social indicators that could be used as inputs in fiscal policy decisions. The lat-
ter include population and a poverty indicator known as Unsatisfied Basic Needs
(UBN). Specifications (2) and (3) use alternative financial indicators, trying to
account for the financial constraints faced by local governments. These con-
straints are particularly important in later years, when the law has required that
regional governments in Colombia obtain authorization from the central level to
increase expenditure if they have been running deficits in previous years. I use
deficit, debt, and fiscal dependence indicators, which were all constructed by me
from the Contraloría data. The Fiscal Dependence indicator, included in both
specification (2) and (3), accounts for the level of fiscal decentralization in the
country, which grew dramatically over this period. It is increasing in the share
of revenues represented by transfers from the central government (as opposed to
the local government’s own fiscal effort). Finally, in specification (4) I include
Incumbent Advantage, measured by the percentage share of votes received by
the incumbent official in the last election. I try to account in this way for the
greater degrees of freedom that a popular incumbent has when choosing fiscal
policy. Appendix C provides sources and more details on how these controls were
generated.
Figure 3.3 depicts the evolution of per-capita spending, deficits, and debt,
while Figure 3.4 shows the fiscal dependence index. The increasing trend in all
of these variables reflects the growing level of decentralization in the country.
the timing of elections in Colombia, most years are either a pre-election year or a post-election
year.
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              Specification
Control (1) (2) (3) (4)
T(t) x x x x
y(i,t-1) x x x x
GDP_PC(i,t-1) x x x x
UBN(i,t-1) x x x x
POPULATION(i,t-1) x x x x
DEFICIT(i,t-1) x x
DEBT_84(i,t-1) x
T*FISCAL_DEP(t) x x x
VOTE SHARE(i, prev.elect) x
Table 3.3: List of control variables
3.4.2 Regression specification
Since I have more than 1,000 cross-sectional units, estimating the city-specific
effects (ai) separately is not efficient. I therefore use the first-differenced version
of relationship (3.1).12 The specification can be written as:
∆yit = b ∗∆yit−1 +
X
k
ck ∗∆xk,it + d ∗∆elecdumt + uit (3.2)
where
uit = ∆εit
Note that I have dropped the i subindex for elecdum, since elections occur
at the same time in all districts. Also, the model in differences does include a
12Due to econometric problems related to the autoregressive component, a fixed-effects es-
timator is not appropriate, as it would yield biased estimates. While lags of the endogenous
variables can be used as instruments in the first-differences specification to address this problem,
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of fiscal dependence
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constant and a linear trend, since the controls include a quadratic trend (with
both linear and quadratic terms). Given that the first local election is dated in
1988, in the regressions the initial t is 1987 (the first pre-election period). Data
for previous years provide instruments in the estimations.
Regression (3.2) is affected by the familiar endogeneity problem: the error
term now includes εi,t−1 which is correlated with ∆yt−1, and also includes εi,t
which is correlated with the xt if these outcomes are affected by contemporane-
ous fiscal policy. To address this problem, I follow the approach suggested by
Anderson and Hsiao (1982), and estimate (3.2) by 2SLS, using yi,t−2 and yi,t−3
to instrument the ∆yi,t−1, and xi,t−1 and xi,t−2 to instrument the ∆xi,t13. Un-
der my assumption that εi,t is white noise makes this instruments valid, in the
sense of being orthogonal to the innovations. As a robustness check, I re-do
these estimations using a GMM approach with the same matrix of instruments.
I also run regression (3.1) in levels by OLS, replacing the city-specific effect with
time-invariant variables for each municipality. This last model is specified as
follows:
yit = a1 ∗ surfi + a2 ∗ disti +
6X
r=3
ar ∗ regiondumi (3.3)
+ b ∗ yit−1 +
X
k
ck ∗ xk,it + d ∗ elecdumt + ²it
13A widely used alternative methodology is the one suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).
I do not use this approach because, with the relatively large numbers of periods (15) and
endogenous variables (up to 5) in my estimations, the matrix of instruments suggested by these
authors would contain a minimum of 60 columns, even if we only use two lags as instruments
for each period. Besides being computationally consuming, GMM estimators with such a large
number of overidentifying restrictions are known to have poor finite sample properties (see
Wooldridge, 2002, for a discussion).
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where I include the surface covered by the city or state, its average distance
with respect to main markets in the country, and dummies for the four main
regions in the country. I report robust standard errors. I refer to the results from
OLS and GMM estimations in the text, but do not report these results to avoid
overcrowding the paper with tables.
The dependent variables are expressed in logs, as are population, GDP, and
UBN. Note from Table 3.2 that I have a total of 12,318 observations, 5,289 of
which fall in pre-electoral periods. All reported regressions are weighted by expen-
ditures; results are largely robust to eliminating these weights. I also conducted
some robustness tests varying in the sample (both in terms of time periods and
of districts included in the regression). These changes did not affect results im-
portantly.
3.4.3 Regression results
Results for the political dummy in which we are interested, d, are presented in
Tables 4 and 5. To facilitate reading, estimates for other coefficients are not
reported, but are available from the author upon request. In these tables, each of
columns (1) through (4) represents a different set of controls, as detailed in Table
3.3. Each row corresponds to a different regression, and the dependent variable
for that regression is recorded in the first column. Throughout the paper, results
in bold letters are significant at the 5% level, while results in bold and italics are
significant at 10%. When interpreting the size of estimated coefficients, keep in
mind that expenditure variables are expressed in logs.
I run two versions of equation (3.2). Table 3.4 presents results for the first
of those versions, where yi,t corresponds to the share of total expenditure repre-
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sented by a specific type of spending. For instance, the row marked CURRENT
reports the estimate of d when the dependent variable is current expenditure as a
share of total expenditure (including interest payments, i.e. total spending is not
simply the sum of current spending and investment, which is why conducting the
exercise for both categories is not redundant). This is motivated by theoretical
models that, as mentioned, suggest PBCs should take the form of changes in the
composition of the budget, rather than its size.
The results point to a change in the composition of expenditure away from
current expenditures and into capital spending. The categories of investment as-
sociated with most visible infrastructure projects, namely construction of roads,
infrastructure, housing, and water, power, and communications (POWER), all
show pre-electoral expansions. These are significant, both statistically and eco-
nomically; for instance, in some of the estimates expenditure in infrastructure
grows by around 60% prior to elections. Other categories of investment, more
related to the provision of universal (as opposed to targeted) goods, as health
and education, do not show similar pre-electoral cycles. At the same time, there
is a contraction of current spending, which can be attributed to a decrease in the
share of the budget represented by current transfers14. These findings are consis-
tent with an opportunistic pre-electoral expansion of targeted expenditures.
14This may seem puzzling, since the theoretical literature frequently refers to targeted expen-
ditures as transfers to the targeted groups. However, the reader should not confuse these with
“Current Transfers”, as defined in the Colombian government accounts. These cover benefits
to retired and temporary employees, and transfers to other levels of government. None of these
is likely to constitute a group of voters worthy of pre-electoral targeting. As argued above, in
the government accounts pre-electoral opportunistic transfers are more likely captured by some
investment categories.
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Dependent variable: Type of expenditure          Electoral effect (coefficient d )
(as a fraction of total expenditure) (1) (2) (3) (4)
CURRENT -0.143 -0.026 -0.059 0.001
(0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
GENERAL -0.059 0.011 -0.003 0.079
(0.028) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
PERSONNEL -0.036 0.005 -0.019 0.039
(0.032) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
TRANSFERS -0.413 -0.290 -0.334 -0.266
(0.035) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
INVESTMENT 0.206 0.110 0.134 0.101
(0.088) (0.031) (0.025) (0.016)
INFRASTRUCTURE 1.277 0.630 0.818 0.526
(0.237) (0.157) (0.243) (0.109)
ROADS 1.112 0.693 0.639 0.820
(0.160) (0.130) (0.128) (0.153)
POWER 0.782 0.466 0.373 0.517
(0.140) (0.114) (0.090) (0.124)
HOUSING 0.915 0.717 0.772 0.420
(0.919) (0.760) (0.830) (0.302)
EDUCATION 0.346 0.008 -0.008 0.165
(0.085) (0.073) (0.069) (0.068)
HEALTH 0.227 -0.011 -0.005 0.191
(0.072) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076)
Notes: This table presents estimates for coefficient d in regression (3.2). Estimation is done by 2SLS.
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is the share of total
expenditure represented by a different category (current, general, etc).
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls as detailed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.4: Effect of elections on the composition of total expenditures
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My choice of instruments is greatly restricted by data availability, since not
many other variables are measured at the local level. However, the set of in-
struments I use, consisting of the lags of potentially endogenous variables, does
seem to perform relatively well. The relevance of the instruments should not
be of much concern, since most of these variables exhibit persistence: economic
activity, poverty, and the size of the population are all variables that change only
slowly over time. Below, I show that government spending also shows inertial
dynamics. The first stage R-squared for endogenous variables are in most cases
around 0.3. To test the exogeneity of the instruments, I run regressions of the
residuals from equation (3.2) on the matrix of instruments used for each case.
Intuitively, the R-squared from these regressions should be low if the instruments
are indeed exogenous. These R-squared are indeed quite small, ranging in size
from 0.005 in the regressions from transfers to around 0.04 in the regressions for
personnel spending. However, they are not small enough to support the hypothe-
sis that instruments are exogenous in a formal Chi-squared test15, as is frequently
the case when using large panels.
Regressions with other methods, and/or without weights, produce similar
results. OLS regressions of the specification (3.3) actually show significant pre-
election increases in all the reported components of investment, accompanied by
contractions of current transfers and some subcomponents of personnel spending.
GMM estimates of (3.2) are mostly similar. The main exception is in the weighted
estimations, where GMM estimates of the electoral effect on total investment lose
15Under the null hypothesis that instruments are exogenous, the product of this R-squared
and the number of observations follows a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions. In my case, these statistics are frequently
larger than the corresponding critical value.
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significance.
I repeat these regressions setting yit equal to the log level of expenditure in a
given category. That is, I look for effects on spending amounts, rather than shares
of overall spending. Table 3.5 presents the results of this approach. As in Table
3.4, spending on total investment, infrastructure, power, and roads all show pre-
electoral increases. The level of current transfers, meanwhile, contracts. These
effects are large in size, approaching 20% in absolute value for infrastructure,
roads, water and power plants, and transfers. An interesting result from these
regressions is that payments to personnel increase by about 8% prior to elections
16. Education expenditure also increases significantly before elections. Overall
expenses do not show any economically significant change in the pre-election
periods (even when statistically significant, the change is smaller than 2%).
OLS (for equation 3.3) and GMM estimations yield very similar results. The
main difference is that the effect on total investment loses significance in those two
specifications, although the effects on its main subcomponents remain significant
and large. The GMM estimation also fails to identify any significant effect on
housing expenditures.
In sum, the results indicate a pre-election shift of government resources from
current spending into investment types of expenditures, while the overall budget
does not experience significant changes. This is consistent with the view that
incumbents try to obtain voters’ support by increasing the provision of goods
that are most valuable and/or visible to them, while avoiding large deteriorations
16The finding of a pre-electoral expansion of personnel expenditures would be consistent with
the widespread idea that politicians in Colombia trade government jobs in exchange for political
support.
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of the overall balance. Is this strategy optimal to tilt election outcomes in favor
of the incumbent? Trying to answer this question I now examine some empirical
evidence on the link between the government’s budget and election outcomes.
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Dependent variable: Type             Electoral effect (coefficient d )
of expenditure (1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTAL -0.089 0.015 0.018 -0.013
(0.072) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
CURRENT -0.030 -0.014 -0.051 -0.035
(0.028) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013)
GENERAL 0.008 0.058 0.050 0.054
(0.048) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
PERSONNEL 0.112 0.067 0.077 0.067
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TRANSFERS -1.778 -0.213 -0.278 -0.261
(1.251) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
INVESTMENT 0.069 0.051 0.090 0.046
(0.042) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.249 0.224 0.199 0.197
(0.049) (0.043) (0.059) (0.047)
ROADS 0.331 0.265 0.261 0.252
(0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.045)
POWER 0.325 0.287 0.275 0.257
(0.052) (0.042) (0.039) (0.055)
HOUSING 0.632 0.615 0.604 0.237
(0.329) (0.316) (0.320) (0.287)
EDUCATION 0.089 0.067 0.071 0.033
(0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.035)
HEALTH -0.078 -0.014 0.028 -0.136
(0.057) (0.044) (0.041) (0.093)
Notes: This table presents estimates for coefficient d in regression (3.2.).
Estimation is done by 2SLS. Standard errors in parentheses.
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is a 
given type of government expenditure.
Each column corresponds to a different set of controls as detailed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.5: Effect of elections on different types of expenditure
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3.5 Do voters reward targeted spending?
The evidence presented above is consistent with the view that elected officials
face incentives to manipulate the budget before elections, in order to improve
the chances that their parties will be re-elected. The implicit foundation for this
view is that voters’ support for the incumbent is affected by his previous fiscal
choices. One argument is that all increases in spending should boost popular
support for the government, because of their expected favorable effects on eco-
nomic activity. According to theoretical models of the PBC, however, the reason
why rational voters care about past fiscal policies when deciding whether to re-
elect an incumbent is that the fiscal choices of an incumbent reflect persistent
personal characteristics. Past policies are therefore an indication of the policies
the incumbent would enact if re-elected, and because of this reason they influ-
ence voters’ perceptions about the incumbent. In Rogoff’s (1990) model voters’
support depends positively on the provision of goods visible to voters, which they
associate with higher competence. Meanwhile, the model presented in chapter
2 suggests that voters react favorably to increases in targeted spending, even if
they dislike incumbents who run deficits17.
Three obvious questions come to mind. Does recent fiscal policy indeed affect
the choices of voters? If so, what are the directions of those effects? Finally, is
there evidence that an incumbent’s fiscal choices are indeed persistent? I devote
this section to answering the two first questions, while the last one is addressed
17Models of competence inference (e.g. Rogoff 1990 and Shi and Svensson 2001) are also
consistent with voters punishing high deficits, under the assumption thatif at least some voters
observe the overall budget. Informed voters associate higher deficits, for any given level of
spending, with lower competence of the incumbent.
132
in the section 3.7.
3.5.1 Data
As argued before, the relevant definition of “incumbent” for the Colombian case
is the incumbent party, since officials cannot run for direct re-election. I therefore
use data on the share of votes obtained by each party in the local mayor elections
of 1992-2000 (four elections). Unfortunately, for previous elections only the share
of votes obtained by the winner of the election is available, so that full party
shares cannot be calculated18.
Politics in Colombia have been traditionally dominated by two major parties,
Liberal and Conservative. While some candidates, particularly in the 1990’s, ran
under the banner of a myriad of different parties or political movements, many
of these movements can be traced back to the traditional parties, and voters in
each locality are frequently aware of those ties19. In that sense, elections are still
mainly a contest between these two major parties, although there are also two
smaller left-wing parties and some truly independent political groups.
The challenge is to identify in the data which candidates are associated with
one of the major parties, in order to calculate the appropriate shares of party
18It is often the case that several candidates run for the same party, so that the votes received
by one candidate cannot be assumed to equal the votes received by his party in that election.
19There are two reasons why candidates prefer to run for movements linked to the parties,
rather than the parties themselves. The first is that by creating a new group they can access
funding that is available for each political organization in the race. The second is that voters
have grown suspicious of the political practices (not necessarily the ideals) of the traditional
parties. Candidates then try to avoid being associated with those practices by running outside
the structure of the party.
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votes. I use information from external sources, including informal accounts, to
match the different movements with the traditional party division between liber-
als and conservatives. Appendix C contains a list of movements and parties that
I have been able to match with the larger parties. All movements not listed in
appendix C are considered “independents” in my analysis.
I calculate the share of votes obtained by, for instance, the Liberal party, as
the sum of the shares obtained by all the smaller organizations linked to the
Liberal party in that list. Since some apparently independent groups may indeed
also be Liberal or Conservative, even if I am not able to identify them as such,
the share of votes my calculations assign to a given major party is a lower bound.
Table 3.6 presents some summary statistics; panel 1 refers to vote shares, and
panel 2 to number of elections won. Columns (1) and (2) record statistics for the
Liberal and Conservative party, respectively, while column (3) shows statistics
for the predominant party in each election (between conservatives and liberals).
Figures in column (4) correspond to the winning candidate. The high frequency
of zero shares is due to the fact that these measures are lower bounds. Note
that, despite this fact, in 50% of the elections at least one of the major parties
receives 65% of the votes (column (3)). Moreover, the predominance of the two
parties is confirmed by the fact that, out of 3880 total elections, 2880 are won
by a candidate that I can tie to one of these parties. Votes to the predominant
party tend to exceed those obtained by the winning candidate, since often more
than one candidate runs for each party.
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                      Party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Liberal Conservative Max(lib,cons) Max (candidates)
Mean 39.69 30.79 63.81 58.68
Median 37.91 32.39 64.93 54.51
Panel 1: 25 percentile 0 0 45.11 47.79
vote shares 75 percentile 74.50 57.39 95.63 66.60
Maximum 100 100 100 100
Minimum 0 0 0 20.38
Wins 1650 1230
Panel 2: elections 
won
Wins running 
within the party 1597 1064




Table 3.6: Summary statistics for election outcomes
3.5.2 The effect of fiscal policy on vote shares
I study here the relation between the share of total votes obtained by each of
the two major parties and pre-electoral fiscal policy. As in previous studies, the
effect of the overall budget is captured by the government’s deficits. However, I
have already highlighted that theoretical models suggest that voters see targeted,
more visible, expenditures with a different eye than they see the rest of spend-
ing. I therefore attempt to distinguish the effects of these spending categories.
Following the previous discussion, I treat investment spending as targeted expen-
diture, and current spending as non-targeted expenditure. I run a regression of
the following form:
votespit = α0 + α1votespit−1 (3.4)
+ (α2investit + α3currentit + α4deficitit + α5grit−1) ∗ incpit−1 + εitp
The time indices here refer to election periods, so that t is the current election
135
and t − 1 the previous election. votespit is the share (in percentages) of votes
obtained by party p in city i during the t election. For this analysis, I treat zero
vote shares as missing values, since I suspect that most of these cases do not reflect
that a major party did not present any candidate, but rather that I cannot tie a
candidate to the party he belongs to. Vote shares are modeled as a function of
the interaction between fiscal variables and the discrete variable incpit−1, which
takes the value of 1 if party p is in office at the time of the election and −1
otherwise. The fiscal variables correspond to the pre-election year; I include the
log of investment spending (investit), the log of current spending (currentit),
and the per capita government deficit (deficitit). Average GDP growth between
t − 1 and t (grit−1) is also considered to control for other observables that may
affect voters’ perceptions about the incumbent. Under the assumption that εitp
captures the part of voting behavior that the politician cannot predict, fiscal
policy decisions cannot be based on those innovations, and the policy variables
included in the regression should satisfy the restriction of being orthogonal to the
error term.
Results are reported in Table 3.7; column (1) reports estimates of (3.4) with
the expenditure variables (invest and current) in per-capita terms, while for
column (2) the expenditure regressors are expressed as shares of total expenditure
(these shares do not add up to one, since interest payments is not included in any
of these categories). Note that the dependent variable is expressed as percentages,
while the spending measures are in logs.
As previous studies have found for other countries (e.g. Brender, 2003, for Is-
rael, and Peltzman, 1992, for the US), and contrary to traditional interpretations
of the PBC, my results indicate that Colombian voters penalize the incumbent
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party for running high deficits. Furthermore, high capital expenditures (which
I interpret as targeted spending) increase the share of votes obtained by the
incumbent party, while current (“non-targeted”) expenditure has no significant
effect20. A one percent increase in per capita investment increases the fraction
of votes obtained by the incumbent party by about 0.03%, while a two standard
deviation increase in the deficit per capita (about $4,000 pesos of 1998) decreases
the share of votes to the incumbent party by close to 0.08%. These results are
consistent with the view that voters dislike incumbents who run high deficits,
while they value specific types of expenditures. They are also consistent with my
results on electoral changes in the composition of spending, that show incum-
bents increasing targeted spending before the elections, while they try to avoid
concomitant increases in the overall budget. According to findings in this section,
this fiscal strategy is optimal in terms of maximizing the share of votes that go
to the incumbent party in the upcoming election.
20GDP growth does not have any significant effect. This result is not surprising result since
my measure of GDP is at the state level. Voters probable do not “blame” the local mayor for
the state economy’s performance.
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Votes to P in past election 0.485 0.507
(0.026) (0.030)
Deficit * incumbent -0.023 -0.019
(0.009) (0.009)
Investment Expenditure 2.757 5.282
*incumbent (0.805) (1.414)
Current Expenditure 1.312 -0.070
*incumbent (0.787) (0.660)




Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation 3.4.
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
The (log of) expenditure variables are either in per capita terms (column (1))
or fractions of total expenditure (column (2))
Incumbent is 1 if party P is in power at the time of the election, -1 otherwise
Table 3.7: Effect of fiscal performance on vote shares
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3.6 The effect of ideological polarization: PBCs
in swing cities
The model introduced in chapter 2 also suggests that electoral effects on the
budget should vary depending on the level of loyalty of voters to one party or the
other. The incumbent’s core voters will support him even if they do not expect
to receive targeted transfers from him in the future, and the opposite is true for
the challenger’s core voters. In this sense, pre-electoral manipulation of targeted
versus non-targeted spending should be more of an issue in societies with a large
fraction of uncommitted, or swing, voters.
This section examines how the extent of the electoral effect depends on the
degree of polarization in a given district. I begin by characterizing districts as
swing and non-swing, on the basis of five different measures of degree of commit-
ment to one of the two major parties. In all of the cases, the swing variable is
a dummy equal to 0 if the district is not swing, 1 if the district is swing. The
three first measures are time invariant, while I allow the other two to vary from
election to election. The definitions are as follow:
1. Swing_freqelec: district is not swing if the same party won at least 5 of
the 7 elections in the period21.
2. Swing_actual_vote: district is not swing if one of the parties obtained
at least 70% of the votes in every election in the 1992-2000 period22. The 70%
threshold is based on the summary statistics of vote shares (see Table 3.6): in
21Even though I only have voting shares for 1992-2000, my data base does contain the winning
candidate’s party affiliation for all the elections.
22The period limitation responds to data availability.
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half of my sample elections, one major party obtained at least 64% of the votes,
and that number rises to 71% if I omit elections in which I could not tie any
candidate to a major party (as will be the case in this section).
3. Swing_fitted_vote: same as swing_actual_vote, but constructed using
projected rather than actual vote shares. The fitted vote shares come for a re-
gression identical to (3.4), except that I allow the coefficients to vary for the
Liberal party with respect to the Conservative party. Vote shares are projected
by fixing investment at 0, since the ideological polarization of a group in the
model of chapter 2 (the degree to which it is not “swing”) represents its coin-
cidence with one party on issues other than targeted spending. An important
conceptual advantage of these projected measures is that they eliminate the po-
tential endogeneity of swing measures with respect to government investment.
4. Swingtemp_actual_vote: time-varying measure. District is not swing in
election period t if in election t− 1 the ruling party obtained at least 70% of the
votes.
5. Swingtemp_fitted_vote: same as swingtemp_actual_vote but using pro-
jected vote shares (again, assuming investment is zero) rather than actual.
The fraction of districts identified as swing is 57% for the first measure
(swing_freqelec), around 75% for the time-invariant measures based on vote frac-
tions, and around 60% for the time-varying measures. Some summary statistics
for the projected vote shares are recorded in Table 3.8. The projected vote shares
exhibit less dispersion than the actual shares, and have higher means (the actual
shares are summarized in Table 3.6); those means exceed 50% for both parties
due to the presence of missing values, more prevalent in districts where the party
is not dominant. For each party, the projected share is positively correlated
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Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Projected vote share Liberal 
party 63.912 13.536 36.550 80.704
Projected vote share 
Conservative party 60.006 19.714 23.252 86.440








Actual vote share 
Cons. party
Projected vote share Liberal 
party 1 0.394 -0.624 -0.349
Actual vote share Liberal 
party 1 -0.426 -0.175
Projected vote share 
Conservative party 1 0.546
Actual vote share 
Conservative party 1
Table 3.8: Summary statistics for fitted vote shares
with the actual share, and negatively correlated with the actual share for the
other party. Table 3.9 presents sample correlations between the different swing
dummies, which are low in many cases. The only high correlations are between
the two time-varying dummies (0.995), and between the time-invariant measures
obtained from projected votes and from the frequency of wins. I place most con-
fidence in the swing dummy based on the frequency of wins, and the time-varying
measure based on actual votes. This is because the difficulties in correctly iden-
tifying which candidates are tied to which parties, and the resulting proliferation
of missing values for the vote shares, place doubts on swing measures that de-
pend on being able to follow vote shares within a district over time. The three
other dummies for swing districts (swing_actual_vote, and the two dummies
that depend on projected vote shares) are affected by this problem.
To analyze whether the electoral change in the composition of spending differs
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freqelec actual_vote fitted_vote temp_actual temp_fitted
swing_freqelec 1 0.058 0.452 0.056 0.053
swing_actual_vote 1 0.083 0.014 0.013
swing_fitted_vote 1 0.011 0.008
swingtemp_actual_vote 1 0.995
swingtemp_fitted_vote 1
Table 3.9: Sample correlations for swing district dummies
between swing and non-swing districts, I add an interaction between the election
dummy and the swing district dummy to the basic regression (3.2). The modified
empirical model is:




+ d ∗∆elecdumt + s ∗∆(elecdumt ∗ swingti) + uit
where swingit is one of the swing district dummies defined above. The d co-
efficient captures now the electoral effect in non-swing districts, while the cor-
responding effect in swing districts is given by d + s. I express the dependent
variables as shares of total spending, since this exercise is motivated by the ex-
penditure composition model of chapter 2.
For non-swing districts, the electoral effect reflects possible electoral motives
outside the expenditure composition incentive. Given the above discussion, one
would expect those electoral incentives to capture the need for reducing the deficit
in order to attract votes23. The d coefficient should therefore be negative. The
23As mentioned, loyalty to one party is defined in terms of the coincidence with that party in
issues other than targeted spending. Hence, non swing districts cannot be swayed by targeting
expenditures to them, but can change their support to one or another candidate as a result of
shifts in other issues. These other issues include the overall budget. Given the preference of
voters for smaller overall budgets, increases in spending should negatively affect the incumbent
party in non-swing districts.
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electoral incentives to change the composition of expenditure toward targeted
spending are reflected in d+ s. I would thus expect d+ s > 0 for components of
expenditure related to targeted spending (such as investment), and d+ s < 0 for
at least some of the other components. The results of estimating equation (3.5) by
2SLS, using the same instruments as in previous tables, are presented in Tables
3.10 and 3.11. Table 3.10 reports results using the time-invariant definitions
of swing districts (definitions 1, 2 and 3), while Table 3.11 reports results for
the time-varying measures (definitions 4 and 5). The set of controls included
in the estimation is the one listed under column (4) in Table 3.3. Besides the
coefficients’ estimates and their standard errors, I include the Wald statistic for
the null hypothesis that d+s = 0, that is, that the electoral effect is not significant
for swing districts24.
The results are consistent with the preceding discussion. In non-swing dis-
tricts several types of expenditures exhibit a pre-electoral contraction. This result
is robust to different measures of swing districts, except for the time-invariant
dummy based on actual vote shares, under which I find no electoral effect at all
in non-swing districts. Swing districts, however, exhibit changes in the composi-
tion of spending consistent with the pattern described above: current spending
contracts, mostly due to a reduction in current transfers, and this contraction is
larger than the effect observed for non-swing districts. The infrastructure-related
category of road construction shows an expansion, and the other investment cat-
egories, education and health, do not exhibit the contraction they display for
24Note that less categories of spending are listed in this table due to data problems: since
election results for major parties are only available for some districts, and the coverage of the
spending data also varies across districts and categories of expenditure, for some categories the




type of expenditure           swing_freqelec       swing_actual_vote        swing_fitted_vote














-0.295 0.109 1.505 -1.716 -0.283 0.086
CURRENT (0.057) (0.035) (1.001) (0.998) (0.064) (0.041)
Wald stat: joint effect 8.504 11.911 10.039
-0.006 0.148 1.478 -1.382 -0.008 0.131
GENERAL (0.118) (0.063) (1.816) (1.810) (0.131) (0.074)
Wald stat: joint effect 1.206 0.617 0.971
-0.182 0.086 2.192 -2.296 -0.195 0.096
PERSONNEL (0.083) (0.055) (1.609) (1.606) (0.095) (0.065)
Wald stat: joint effect 1.140 1.471 1.265
-0.792 -0.159 2.830 -3.747 -0.706 -0.244
TRANSFERS (0.183) (0.091) (2.446) (2.429) (0.206) (0.113)
Wald stat: joint effect 27.147 26.373 28.060
0.227 0.970 -2.879 3.655 0.013 1.044
ROADS (0.294) (0.311) (5.588) (5.611) (0.349) (0.366)
Wald stat: joint effect 10.813 7.129 9.523
-0.485 0.566 0.047 -0.200 -0.493 0.456
EDUCATION (0.110) (0.107) (2.168) (2.171) (0.128) (0.124)
Wald stat: joint effect 0.437 2.065 0.099
-0.444 0.573 1.576 -1.722 -0.403 0.366
HEALTH (0.107) (0.107) (2.175) (2.177) (0.128) (0.124)
Wald stat: joint effect 1.140 1.875 0.105
Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation (3.5) by 2SLS. 
Columns correspond to different regressions, changing the swing district dummy. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The Wald statistic corresponds to H0: d+s=0. 
Bold characters denote significance at 5% level. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Table 3.10: Effect of elections on government expenditure: swing versus non-




Dependent variable: type 
of expenditure   swingtemp_actual_vote     swingtemp_fitted_vote










-0.138 -0.324 -0.096 -0.383
CURRENT (0.052) (0.067) (0.050) (0.062)
Wald stat: joint effect 19.871 25.522
0.103 0.358 0.095 0.342
GENERAL (0.122) (0.205) (0.114) (0.176)
Wald stat: joint effect 2.270 2.719
-0.115 -0.224 -0.093 -0.247
PERSONNEL (0.075) (0.101) (0.074) (0.099)
Wald stat: joint effect 5.092 5.712
-0.888 -0.340 -0.854 -0.409
TRANSFERS (0.172) (0.231) (0.163) (0.211)
Wald stat: joint effect 10.984 14.098
0.583 1.557 0.683 0.992
ROADS (0.259) (0.660) (0.276) (0.616)
Wald stat: joint effect 7.843 5.457
-0.143 -0.100 -0.167 0.179
EDUCATION (0.103) (0.189) (0.105) (0.206)
Wald stat: joint effect 1.252 0.003
-0.130 -0.036 -0.145 0.073
HEALTH (0.101) (0.227) (0.105) (0.229)
Wald stat: joint effect 0.420 0.085
Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation (3.5) by 2SLS. 
Columns correspond to different regressions, changing the swing district dummy. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The Wald statistic corresponds to H0: d+s=0. 
Bold characters denote significance at 5% level. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Table 3.11: Effect of elections on government expenditure: swing versus non-
swing districts (time-varying dummies)
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3.7 The persistence of expenditure choices
All models in which voters rationally respond to electoral manipulation of the
budget rely on some mechanism that relates pre- and post-election fiscal policy.
This is so because forward looking individuals vote on the basis of what they
expect from the candidates once in office. The empirical implication is that an
official’s fiscal choices should exhibit some inertia.
I analyze here whether the dynamics of government spending in Colombian
municipalities are consistent with this implication. If so, we should observe
that government spending exhibits some persistence, but the inertial component
should be less pronounced in periods in which a power transition occurs25. In par-
ticular, in light of models discussed previously, I examine whether the composition
of spending is persistent over time, and whether that persistence diminishes at
times of power transitions. Since mayors cannot be directly re-elected in Colom-
bia, I look at party transitions. If fiscal policy reflects inertial characteristics
of both parties and officials, the pattern of autocorrelation of spending should
be less pronounced in periods of transition from one mayor to another, but this
difference should be less important when the transition occurs within the same
party.
The empirical model is a modification of the one used in previous sections,
and takes the following form:
25The persistence of government spending is not driven solely by persistent characteristics
of officials. Other factors that contribute to persistence are stable fundamental characteristics
of the economy, relatively rigid spending items (e.g. public employment), and multi-period
spending commitments.
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∆yit = b ∗∆yit−1 +
X
k
ck ∗∆xk,it + d ∗∆elecdumt (3.6)
+ b1 ∗∆ (yit−1 ∗ elecdumt+1) + b2 ∗∆(yit−1 ∗ elecdumt+1 ∗ reelit) + uit
where reelit is a dummy equal to 1 if the same party remains in power between
t− 1 and t, 0 otherwise, and the rest of the notation is as above. Note that the
transitions of officials in power occur at periods given by elecdumt+1. The terms
in the top line of equation 3.6 are the focus of this section. The serial correlation
is given by b in “normal” times, b+ b1 in periods in which the incumbent party is
replaced by a challenger, and b+ b1 + b2 when the same party remains in office,
but the mayor changes. As the previous discussion suggests, the assumption of
persistent official characteristics should be reflected in b > 0, b1 < 0, and b2 > 0
to (partially) offset the negative effect of b1.
As before, I carry this estimation by 2SLS, adding the first and second lags of
yit−1 ∗elecdumt+1 and (in some cases) yit−2 ∗elecdumt+1 to the list of instruments
introduced in section 3.4. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 summarize the results. The
dependent variable for the results reported is the ratio of current to investment
spending, since the focus is on the composition of expenditures between targeted
and non-targeted categories. However, the estimates are qualitatively similar if
I use instead the shares of total spending represented by these categories, or the
levels of investment and current spending. Note that, different from previous
tables, here the rows represent different regressors, while the dependent variable
is the same in all cases. I only report results for the b, b1, b2 and d coefficients,
and the Wald statistic for the null hypothesis that b1 + b2 = 0 (i.e. that all
persistence is due to party characteristics). Table 3.12 presents results using
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what the table calls the “basic set of instruments”, consisting of the instruments
used for previous tables plus the first and second lags of yit−1 ∗ elecdumt+1, while
Table 3.13 reports results adding yit−2 ∗ elecdumt+1 to the set of instruments (for
what the table calls the expanded set of instruments). In both tables, the results
in column (1) come from a specification with the basic set of controls (Table 3.3,
column 1), while in column (2) the full set of controls (Table 3.3, column 4) is
used. The first-stage R-squared is included for each regressor.
Results are consistent with the patterns expected. The ratio of current to
investment spending exhibits high serial correlation, but this correlation falls by
about 10% when the party in power changes. The reduction in the correlation
is only around 2% when the mayor is replaced by someone from the same party.
Note that, consistent with results in previous sections, the ratio of current to
investment spending falls in pre-electoral periods. Also, note that results are
very similar in all columns of Tables 3.12 and 3.13.
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Dependent variable: current expenditure / investment
                  (1)                   (2)
Regressors Basic controls, basic instruments    All controls, basic instruments
Estimates 1st stage       R-squared Estimates
1st stage      
R-squared
Lag dependent variable 0.920 0.730 0.922 0.683
(0.013) (0.019)
Lag dependent * power transition -0.140 0.839 -0.249 0.919
dummy (0.028) (0.034)
Lag dependent * power transition 0.118 0.827 0.288 0.893
dummy* party reelection dummy (0.027) (0.034)
Pre-election dummy (electoral effect) -0.299 1 0.177 1
(0.030) (0.053)
Wald statistic (H0: b1+b2=0)
R-square
Observations
Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation (3.6) by 2sls. 
Columns 1-2 correspond to different sets of controls.
Standard errors in parentheses.  






Table 3.12: Persistence of the composition of government expenditure (basic
instruments)
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Dependent variable: current expenditure / investment
                  (1)                   (2)
Regressors    Basic controls, all instruments      All controls, all instruments
Estimates 1st stage       R-squared Estimates
1st stage     
R-squared
Lag dependent variable 0.923 0.741 0.920 0.744
(0.013) (0.013)
Lag dependent * power transition -0.130 0.887 -0.134 0.892
dummy (0.022) (0.024)
Lag dependent * power transition 0.109 0.862 0.113 0.864
dummy* party reelection dummy (0.021) (0.023)
Pre-election dummy (electoral effect) -0.295 1 -0.294 1
(0.031) (0.040)
Wald statistic (H0: b1+b2=0)
R-square
Observations
Notes: this table presents the results of estimating equation (3.6) by 2sls. 
Columns 1-2 correspond to different sets of controls.
Standard errors in parentheses.  






Table 3.13: Persistence of the composition of government expenditure (all instru-
ments)
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3.8 Electoral cycles in the central government’s
budget
Although I have argued that electoral cycles derived from the targeting of ex-
penditures are most relevant at the local level, where targeting is most efficient,
this phenomenon is no stranger to national level politics. In fact, the idea of
pork projects is most often associated by the public with Congress politics. One
question is, therefore, whether we also observe this type of effect at the national
level. In this section, I take an exploratory look at that question, focusing on the
dynamics of some components of the Colombian central government’s budget.
One problem for this exploration is the short length of the official quarterly
time series on fiscal policy, which begins in 1988. I gathered information to ex-
tend those series, from the official printed reports of the Contraloría General on
the finances of the government26. The resulting data are quarterly frequency,
and cover the 1974.1-2000.1 period. The level of disaggregation is not as detailed
as for the local data, but I can distinguish current from investment spending,
and two subcomponents of current spending: transfers and personnel. The de-
nomination transfers, again, introduces confusions; one must note that these are
current transfers, not including the transfers from the central level to the local
governments, which are actually recorded as a part of investment. I therefore still
regard transfers as a non-targeted type of spending.
Elections occur at predetermined dates, every four years. Presidential and
26The Contraloría General is the same source I use for my local fiscal data. It is the entity in
charge of monitoring the government’s financial statements. More details on the construction
of national level fiscal variables are provided in the appendix.
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Congressional elections are almost simultaneous (a two-month period separates
them), so it is impossible to separate the effect of Congressional elections from
that of a Presidential election. As controls, I use information on unemployment,
GDP and per capita GDP. Sources, definitions, and the dates of presidential
elections are listed in appendix C.




bl ∗ yt−l + c ∗ xt−1 + d ∗ elecdumt + εt (3.7)
where yt is the growth rate of some type of government spending between
t − 1 and t, and xt−1 is a control equal to the growth of either unemployment,
GDP, or per capita GDP, which I date in the previous period for the same reasons
explained before for the local case. elecdumt is the pre-election dummy, which in
this case takes the value of 1 in the two quarters prior to the elections, 0 in all
others. Note that I use L lags of the dependent variable, where L is optimally
chosen following the Akaike criterion.
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 3.14. The table only
shows the estimates for the electoral effect (d), and follows the same conven-
tions used in all other tables. Each column corresponds to a different control
(unemployment, GDP, and per capita GDP for columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively).
I obtain results that are broadly consistent with those observed for the lo-
cal level. First, there is no significant change of total spending before elections.
The sign of the effect is always negative for transfers and current spending, and
positive for investment. However, while the effect on investment is always sig-
nificant, the negative effect on current types of spending is significant only when
controlling for unemployment.
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Dependent variable: Type             Electoral effect (coefficient d )
of expenditure (1) (2) (3)
TOTAL 0.068 0.149 0.148
(0.105) (0.102) (0.102)
CURRENT -0.846 -1.543 -1.561
(0.103) (1.018) (1.020)
PERSONNEL 0.048 0.058 0.053
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
TRANSFERS -0.647 -0.052 -0.049
(0.105) (0.134) (0.133)
INVESTMENT 0.563 0.849 0.843
(0.262) (0.275) (0.275)
Notes: This table presents estimates for coefficient d in regression (3.7).
Estimation is done by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.
Bold characters denote significance at 5%. Bold and italics denote significance at 10%.
Each row corresponds to a different regression, where the dependent variable is a 
given type of government expenditure.
A different control in each: unemployment rate (1), GDP (2), per capita GDP (3)
Table 3.14: Effect of elections on different types of expenditure. Central Govern-
ment.
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I consider these results as indicative that the suggested pre-electoral changes
in the composition of government spending occur also at the national level. One
interesting extension of these results would be to examine the allocation of pre-
electoral payments to the local governments (registered under the investment
heading), and relate these to the level of electoral polarization that characterizes
different districts. At this point, however, the data on regional allocations of
central government expenditures are not readily available.
3.9 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper is to offer a more comprehensive view of electoral cycles
in government spending, integrating the pre-electoral fiscal choices of incumbents
with the impact of those choices on election outcomes. The picture that emerges
is one where voters punish the pre-electoral deterioration of fiscal balances but
reward incumbents who, before the election, increase the provision of goods most
visible and valuable to voters. In terms of maximizing his probability of being
re-elected, therefore, an incumbent’s optimal strategy implies simultaneously in-
creasing spending on those goods favored by voters and contracting other types
of spending. In the Colombian case, this is reflected in pre-electoral shifts of re-
sources away from current spending and into the development of infrastructure-
related projects.
The evidence presented here shows that there is a logic to apparently contra-
dictory pieces of previous evidence, which showed certain types of government
spending growing before elections despite voters’ inclination to replace incum-
bents that chose high spending. It also suggests that the traditional view that
incumbents have electoral incentives to run high deficits does not apply gener-
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ally, even within the group of developing economies, which are frequently seen as
the mecca of political budget cycles. On the contrary, this evidence is consistent
with models that picture the political budget cycle as an electoral manipulation
of the composition, rather than the size of the budget. In the same vein, it is
also consistent with the argument that voters favor specific types of goods, and
incumbents attempt to influence electoral results by spending on those goods.
An interesting question that is left open is to what extent the greater suscepti-
bility of specific types of spending to electoral manipulation reflects heterogeneous
preferences of voters and politicians, as opposed to different degrees of visibility
of public goods. In simpler, although inexact, words, is the PBC more a reflec-
tion of pork politics, or competence signaling? Is it perhaps even a reflection
of incumbents pre-paying important campaign contributors? The answer to this
question requires a different kind of data and empirical strategy, possibly differ-
entiating electoral transfers to specific groups of voters or contributors, and is
part of a future research agenda.
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Appendix A
Technical Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Here I use the specifics of each case (single central banker, and committee CB)
to get to a unique expression. For the committee case, as discussed in section
1.4.2, Evi Pr
p(π0 = πd | π) = Pr p(π0 = πd | π), so terms involving solely Pr p(π0 =
πd | π) are constants in the dove’s problem. Abstracting from these and other
constants, and taking into account that Pr(π = 0 | vi) = 1− Pr(π = πd | vi) and
















p(π0 = πd | π = πd)− Evi Pr p(π0 = πd | π = 0)
¤






(1− φ) Pr(ri = 1 | vi)∆Pr(π0 = πd)
The last term uses the fact that, if ri = 0, i’s replacement votes for πd in the
second period with probability φ. Since a dove chooses vi = 0 if L(vi = 0) <
L(vi = π
d), proposition 1 follows.
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For the single central banker case, the problem can be written:
Min
{vi}












p(π0 = πd | π = vi)






(1− φ) Pr(ri = 1 | vi)∆Pr(π0 = πd)
The expression in proposition 1 follows, taking into account that ∆Pr(π =
πd) = 1 for single central banker case.
A.2 Derivation of equation (1.11)
Letting k be a given member of period 2 committee, the public assigns


























and a similar expression applies if π = 0, with φ− in lieu of φ+. Taking a first
order approximation of this expression around φ+ = φ leads to equation (1.11).
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A.3 Explicit form of condition (1.16)
Note that





























To obtain an explicit form of the condition to choose vi = 0 in the committee
case with government appointments, plug these expressions and equations (1.11)
and (1.17) into condition (1.16).
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of proposition 9.
We first need to prove that (2.28) solves the differential equation (2.27). Note
that
Y (ght ) = e
−E(lnωhC)ght θc0





α) . Also, ḡ is the value of ght that solves
Y (ght ) = 1.
The nonlinear differential equation in the E(lnωhI | ght ) > E(lnωhC) branch
of (2.27) is obviously hard to solve, but we will take the view that voters rather
solve an approximate, linear, form of it. We take a first order Taylor approxima-
tion around Y 0 = x = −θc0e−E(lnω
h





whether we approach from the left or the right. This yields (letting bα = E(α))















































¶ . The solution to this differential
equation takes the form:
































this is identical to (2.28) for E(lnωhI | ght ) > E(lnωhC).
Plugging (2.28) into (2.26) we obtain (2.29).
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Sources and details on data
C.1.1 Data for local level estimations
Population, surface, distance to main markets, and the UBN indicator were pro-
vided by the University of Los Andes’ CEDE. State per capita GDP data are
from DANE (the Colombian Bureau of Statistics). Also, GDP for “new” states
1 is only reported since 1995. Previously, only the sum for all new states was
reported. I impute pre-1995 GDP for these new states by keeping the contribu-
tion of each state to total new-states-GDP constant in its 1994-1996 level. The
Unsatisfied Basic Needs indicator (UBN) summarizes the fraction of households
without proper housing (in terms of number of rooms and construction mate-
rials), without sanitary services, with school-less children, or with a single low
income for more than three people. This poverty indicator is commonly used
with local-level data, because at this level income measures needed to construct
1There is a subset of nine states that were only elevated to the state category in 1991. They
were previously in a different, now disappeared, category of the regional classification. These
are what I call “new” states.
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other poverty indicators are not available.
Debt in specification (3) (Table 3.3) corresponds to the sum of all deficits
incurred by the city since 1984 until December of t−1. Deficit (specification (2))
is the deficit at the end of the previous year. To construct the fiscal dependence
indicator, I first calculate the average share of total revenue that is represented
by transfers of revenue from other levels of government. I use the average over all
regional units, because the decentralization effect I try to account for is a process
dictated by national law. Let this average fiscal dependence for year t be denoted
as ft. The Fiscal Dependence index used in the regressions is calculated as:







where T is the total number of years. The FDt index is therefore close to 0 in
years of intermediate decentralization, positive in years of higher decentralization,
and negative in years of lower decentralization. In the regressions, I interact FDt
with the trend variable, to differentiate the trend effects related to the process of
fiscal decentralization from any other trend effects.
For the pre-1997 elections, I use electoral results recorded in the National
Planning Department Databases, while for 1997 and 2000 I use official results
directly provided by the Registraduría Nacional.
C.1.2 Data for national level estimations
National level fiscal data were taken from several issues of the Revista Informe
Financiero of the Contraloría General. I use the figures for “Agreements”, which
correspond to payments the government is committed to make in the period. To
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make the investment series consistent over time, the contributions of the central
level to the local governments were always included in the definition of invest-
ment. Similarly, the definition of current transfers always includes “operation
contributions”.
The unemployment rate series is from DANE (the National Bureau of Statis-
tics). The original series has missing values for 78.2, 78.4, and 80.2, which filled
using the average of adjacent quarters. GDP is only available for 1977.1-1999.4,
and no unique quarterly series covers the whole period; for 1977-1995 there is a
series from the National Planning Department, while DANE has been in charge
of reporting quarterly GDP since 1994. Following a practice that has become
standard when working with Colombian data I construct a unique series from
the two by seasonally adjusting the pre-94 series to make it compatible with the
DANE series, and using growth rates from one to extend the other.
C.2 Matching political movements and themain
parties
I use information in Pachón (2002), as well as informal consultations, to link some
movements to the traditional parties. I also consider as liberal (conservative) a
movement with the word “Liberal” (“Conservative”) in its name. Table C.1 lists
the matches obtained (the left column lists the name of the party as it appears
in the official records of election results):
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Party or movement Mapping to larger parties




Liberalismo Ind. De Restauracion Liberal
Mov. Convergencia Popular Civica Liberal
Mov. Indepedinte Liberal Mil Liberal
Mov.Renovador De Accion Liberal-Mor Liberal
Nuevo Liberalismo Liberal
Partido Conservador Colombiano Conservative
Mov. Conservatismo Independiente Conservative
Mov. De Integracion Regional Conservative
Mov. De Participacion Popular Conservative
Mov. Humbertista Conservative
Mov. Nal. Conservador Conservative
Mov. Unico De Ren. Conservadora Conservative
Movimiento De Salvacion Nacional Conservative
Movimiento Nueva Fuerza Democratic Conservative
Movimiento Progresismo Democratico Conservative
Movimiento Unionista Conservative
Ad M-19 M-19
Union Patriotica Up Up




The first mayor elections are in March 1988. Before 1994, local elections occurred
every two years, but the frequency has been extended to three years since then.
Table C.2 lists years of elections.
C.3.2 National elections
Elections every four years at predetermined dates. Table C.3 lists the elections
that occur within the period covered by the aggregate fiscal data.
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Table C.2: Dates of elections for Mayors
Election delec=1 in:
May 1976 1975.4 and 1976.1
May 1978 1977.4 and 1978.1
May 1982 1981.4 and 1982.1
May 1986 1985.4 and 1986.1
May 1990 1989.4 and 1990.1
May 1994 1993.4 and 1994.1
May 1998 1997.4 and 1998.1
May 2002 2001.4 and 2002.1
Table C.3: Dates of elections for President
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